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FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FOR SHARED PRIVACY RIGHTS IN STORED
TRANSACTIONAL DATA
Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke*
INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of pervasive, ubiquitous data collection and
retention.1 Modern computer technology permits us to acquire and
retain knowledge, communicate instantly and globally, purchase
goods and services, engage in hobbies, and participate in politics
and cultural affairs, all in less time and with less expense than once
dreamed possible. One major effect of this revolution has been a
serious reduction in an individual’s rights and expectations of
*

Susan W. Brenner is the NCR Distinguished Professor of Law and
Technology at the University of Dayton School of Law. Leo L. Clarke is an
Associate Professor at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School.
1
The phrases “ubiquitous technology” and “ubiquitous computing” are
used interchangeably to refer to technologies woven into the fabric of everyday
life. See, e.g., Niall Winters, Personal Privacy and Popular Ubiquitous
Technology, UBICONF (2004), http://www.uclic.ucl.ac.uk/projects/ubiconf/
materials/Papers/Niall%20Winters.pdf. “Ubiquitous computing involves having
computing devices essentially everywhere in the home, office or public area, as
well as easy, natural ways for people to interact with them. Wireless
technologies, sensors, radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and machineto-machine communications will play a big role in this new area of computing.”
John Blau, German Group Studies Ubiquitous Computing, Data Privacy,
NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 22, 2004, http://www.nwfusion.com/news/
2004/1222germagroup.html. This article focuses on “communicative”
technologies instead of, say, industrial or agricultural technologies. Its concern
is with technologies that can be used to generate information, collect
information and/or share information. See infra Part I. The Fourth Amendment
is, of course, concerned with channeling how law enforcement finds (searches)
and obtains (seizes) varieties of information. See infra Part II.A.
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privacy. It has become increasingly common for data about our
transactions and ourselves (Data) to be collected and retained by
third parties (Collectors) who often disclose more intimate details
of our lives and lifestyles than would have ever been imaginable or
acceptable just a decade ago. In turn, this retention creates an
unprecedented risk that a local, state or federal government
(Government) can obtain, without the need for a warrant, Data
about individuals (Consumers) to which it has never had access.2
This risk arises because a Collector in possession of Data could
decide to disclose that Data to law enforcement officials, and under
certain United States Supreme Court decisions, the Consumer to
whom the Data relates could be deemed to have assumed the risk
of that disclosure.3
2

In 2004, the Pew Internet & American Life Project surveyed “1,286
Internet stakeholders” to elicit their views as to how the Internet will change our
lives between 2004 and 2014. ELON UNIVERSITY, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN
LIFE PROJECT, THE EXPERTS SURVEY, IMAGINING THE INTERNET (2004),
http://www.elon.edu/predictions/q12.aspx. One statement as to which the survey
requested reactions was:
As computing devices become embedded in everything from clothes to
appliances to cars to phones, these networked devices will allow greater
surveillance by governments and businesses. By 2014, there will be
increasing numbers of arrests based on this kind of surveillance by
democratic governments as well as by authoritarian regimes.
Id. Among the responses was the following: “We must think through the way
technology changes what is private, and develop new concepts of reasonable
privacy that preserve liberty and are workable in a networked world.” Id.
3
It appears that the United States Department of Justice may be
considering “the explosive idea” of requiring, presumably through legislation,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to retain records of all e-mail and web
browsing activities by customers. Declan McCullagh, Your ISP as Net
Watchdog, CNET NEWS, June 16, 2005, http://news.com.com/Your+ISP+
as+Net+watchdog/2100-1028_3-5748649.html. A requirement that records be
retained can only indicate a strong Government interest in the types of requests
under consideration in this article. At the present time, the Stored Wire and
Electronic Communication Transaction Records Act requires ISPs to retain
certain transactional records for 90 days only upon Government request and to
produce those records under certain conditions which are consistent with Fourth
Amendment protections. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2005). That statute is not germane to
our discussion because nothing under that statute precludes an ISP from
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Privacy evolved as a “bricks and mortar” concept.4 When the
Fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution, the real-world
was the only world; technology had not yet given us the ability to
transcend the strictures of the real-world.5 We now have that
ability: we can substitute the virtual realities provided by computer
technology for the physical world; we can communicate
instantaneously with almost anyone from almost anywhere and we
use technologies to make our lives easier, to earn our living and
even for our own amusement.
Our use of this technology has resulted in the creation of new
relationships whereby we now use third parties to process or store
information that we previously maintained ourselves. We are also
replacing inefficient real-world relationships that have become too
expensive, too slow or too imprecise. While these changes may
enhance convenience and cost-saving efficiency, they do so at the
expense of privacy. For example, many Internet users now rely on
third-party providers for the digital storage of private documents,
correspondence (including e-mail), business and financial records,
family photographs and hobby information. Do we lose our
privacy interest in those materials when we entrust them to a third
party? In the past, when information was disclosed to educational,
religious and medical institutions it was done either orally or in
scattered paper documents. Now, such information is stored in a
digital format allowing that information to be collected, sorted and
reported in ways never before possible. With the increasing
computerization of home services, from home security services
and cable television to “smart houses,”6 security information that
voluntarily disclosing information to Government without requiring
Government to comply with the Act.
4
The phrase “bricks-and-mortar” “[d]escribes a site that has a physical
presence in the real world (as opposed to a virtual presence in the online
world).” THE WORD SPY (2005), http://www.wordspy.com/words/bricks-andmortar.asp.
5
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 79–105 (1937).
6
“Smart houses” (or “aware homes”) incorporate intelligent, embedded
systems which interact with the occupants and with outside systems. See, e.g.,
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, THE AWARE HOME, http://www.cc.
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was previously available only to family members is now
communicated to databases managed by third parties. The
increasing sophistication of remote sensing and database
technology means that the amount of information available to
providers of utility and telecommunications services has
dramatically increased. Do we lose our privacy interest in that
information because it is now more efficient to collect it in a
database where it can be searched and sorted in a myriad of ways?
This discussion brings us to the question at hand: Can the
Fourth Amendment’s privacy guarantee be adapted to deal with a
world in which technology is increasingly pervasive—a world of
ubiquitous technology?7 In this article, we consider whether Fourth
Amendment protections should apply to Data provided by a
Consumer to a Collector pursuant to a confidentiality agreement
when the Data would not otherwise be available to Government
without a warrant or proof that an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. Our contention is that Fourth Amendment
protection should not vanish simply because advances in
technology permit, and to a certain extent make unavoidable,
massive Data collection and mining that expose Consumers to the
enhanced risks of a Collector’s breach of trust.8 Instead, we argue
gatech.edu/fce/ahri/ [hereinafter THE AWARE HOME]; PHILIPS RESEARCH,
AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE: A NEW USER EXPERIENCE, http://www.research.
philips.com/InformationCenter/Global/FArticleSummary.asp?lNodeId=712
[hereinafter AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE]. See also Mark Ward, Smart Homes Offer
A Helping Hand, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/technology/ 3715927.stm. An “aware home” will “be able to recognize the
people that live in it, adapt . . . to them [and] learn from their behavior.”
AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE, supra. Similar systems will become features of offices,
hotel rooms and other environments. See, e.g., K. DUCATEL ET AL., EUROPEAN
COMM’N, IST ADVISORY GROUP, SCENARIOS FOR AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE IN
2010,
4-7,
(February
2001),
available
at
http://www.
newscenter.philips.com/assets/Downloadablefile//ISTAG_scenarios-31461215.
pdf [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SCENARIOS FOR AMBIENT
INTELLIGENCE].
7
See, e.g., Winters, supra note 1; Blau, supra note 1.
8
Data encryption technologies could be employed to eliminate the risk of
Government access. However, reliance on encryption would not eliminate the
need for Fourth Amendment protection for several reasons. First, Consumers are
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that protection of such Data is mandated by the doctrine of Katz v.
United States,9 which held that the Fourth Amendment protects
information as to which the individual has exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy as long as the expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable. In other words, we argue that the Fourth
Amendment should not permit Government to reap a windfall from
a Collector’s maintenance of confidential information relating to
its transactions with Consumers.
We begin, in Section I, by demonstrating the need for what we
term “relation-based shared privacy.” We briefly explain how
under the Constitution, the societal benefits of pervasive,
ubiquitous technology can only be achieved if we recognize the
privacy of certain stored transactional data. In the absence of a
constitutional recognition of that privacy, the only alternatives are
to forego utilization of the technology or to resort to inefficient
barriers to exploitation of privacy.
Section II(A) explains how relation-based shared privacy is
consistent with a long history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
relating to, and dealing with, technological advances. Section II(B)
then demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s post-Katz
pronouncements about consent and assumption of risk are
inconsistent with that history and the recognition of a privacy
interest in transactional data.
In Section III, we describe in more detail the contours of
relation-based shared privacy. We define the nature of the required
relationship between Consumer and Collector and the criteria Data
must meet to receive Fourth Amendment protection. Essentially,
the Consumer is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for Data
unlikely to undertake encryption of their own accord, if only because current
encryption techniques are difficult to use, at least for those who do not have
some technical expertise. Second, encryption would lead to its own
inefficiencies because uniform standards of encryption do not yet exist. As a
result, encryption would reduce the benefits of pervasive technology to the
extent it would interfere with the ability to gather and mine data obtained at
various times and from various sources for commercial and other purposes.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that Government could not obtain from the
Collector the necessary key(s) to the encrypted data.
9
389 U.S. 347 (1967). For more on Katz, see infra Part II.A.
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maintained by a Collector pursuant to a confidentiality agreement
and with whom the Collector has a “trust-based” relationship (with
“trust-based” defined broadly and not legally), as long as the Data
is maintained at least in part for the Consumer’s benefit and is
directly accessible by the Consumer. We conclude that, if those
conditions are satisfied, Government should not be able to obtain
the Data merely upon request to the Collector, absent proof that
Government could otherwise have obtained the Data through use
of its ordinary procedures in the course of a good faith
investigation of a crime.
I. THE NEED FOR PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF UBIQUITOUS
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to
the next step which must be taken . . . for securing to the
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right ‘to be let
alone.’10
10

Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890), available at http://www.louisville.edu/library/law/
brandeis/privacy.html (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d
ed. 1888)) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis]. The Fourth Amendment offered no
protection from these activities because it only applies to state action. See, e.g.,
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961). The “evils” Warren and Brandeis
were addressing resulted from the efforts of private citizens, which is why they
ultimately cast their right to privacy as a tort: those whose privacy was violated
could bring an “action of tort for damages in all cases” and could seek an
injunction in “a very limited class of cases.” Warren & Brandeis, supra at 219.
This aspect of the Warren-Brandeis right is relevant to the present discussion
because it represents an early attempt to deal with the impact technology has
upon “informational privacy,” i.e., with an individual’s ability to exercise some
control over how the private sector gathers, disseminates and uses personal
information. See, e.g., Winters, supra note 1 (explaining informational privacy
as the ability of “‘individuals, groups or institutions to determine when, how and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others’”) (quoting
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) [hereinafter WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM]). See also Alan F. Westin, Social and Political Dimensions of
Privacy, 59 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 431, 431 (2003) [hereinafter Westin, Social and
Political Dimensions] (explaining privacy as “the claim of an individual to
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In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their
famous article, The Right to Privacy,11 which argued for a common
law cause of action for invasion of an individual’s privacy. This
differed from the contemporaneous Fourth Amendment concept of
privacy because the common law cause of action (i) was directed
at private parties and (ii) did not involve a zero-sum approach to
privacy.12 The article is of interest here for two reasons. First, it
was an early recognition of the changing notion of privacy in our
society, especially in light of technological advances such as
photography, newspaper publishing and the interception of
telephone communications.13 Second, and more importantly, it
represents an early attempt to deal with the impact technology has
upon “informational privacy.”14 Warren and Brandeis
determine what information about himself or herself should be known to
others . . . . This, also, involves . . . what uses will be made of it by others”). See
generally Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1335, 1350 (1992).
11
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193.
12
Id. As is explained later in the text, the Fourth Amendment has
historically been interpreted as incorporating a zero-sum conception of privacy.
In a zero-sum conception of privacy, only two states exist: private or not-private.
13
See infra note 14. For an extensive analysis of the background and
content of the Warren & Brandeis article, see Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth
Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, __ MISS. L. J. __ (2005)
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Brenner].
14
Warren and Brandeis were reacting to late nineteenth-century
technology: improved printing and photograph reproduction, hand-held cameras,
bugs and other eavesdropping devices. These and other technologies
transformed personal information into a commodity; the press in prior eras had
published information about “notables,” but the subjects were usually able to
control the information that went to the press. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHUDSON,
DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 12-57
(1978). See generally FREDERICK HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM 1690-1872 (1873). The proliferation of informational technologies and
attendant demand for information that arose at the end of the nineteenth century
changed all this; the socially- and politically-prominent were obvious targets.
See, e.g., id. at 1352 n.84 (illustrating how the press hounded President Grover
Cleveland on his honeymoon). However, just as today, the technology soon
affected all segments of the population. See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN
FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO
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demonstrated that an individual’s ability to exercise some control
over how the private sector gathers, disseminates and uses personal
information is fundamental to an ordered society.15 Warren and
Brandeis faced several conceptual difficulties in articulating their
new right to informational privacy. For our purposes, the most
fundamental difficulty went to the essence of the principle: What is
“private”? The Fourth Amendment has historically been
interpreted as incorporating a zero-sum conception of privacy in
which only two states exist: private or not-private.16 However, this
simplistic notion did not work for Warren and Brandeis because
they were deeply concerned with how new technologies affected
traditional understandings of privacy, particularly with regard to
the capturing and exploiting of information that was in the public
domain, such as photographs and descriptions of the activities of
the social or political elite.17 In this vein, since it was Warren and
Brandeis’s goal to control the collection, dissemination and use of
information about individuals, they sought to redefine “privacy” to
make it more consistent with and analogous to a property right.18
The eventual adoption by virtually every U.S. state of the WarrenBrandeis analysis demonstrates that such a redefinition was an
essential consequence of the evolution of these particular
THE INTERNET 125, 138-39 (2000). Warren and Brandeis have been accused of
being elitist, and they were primarily concerned about intrusions into the privacy
of the “upper-crust,” both because they belonged to that society and because
members of that society were primary targets for yellow journalists. See id. at
135-36.
15
See, e.g., Winters, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining how informational
privacy is the ability of “individuals, groups or institutions to determine when,
how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”)
(quoting WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, supra note 10). See also Westin,
Social and Political Dimensions, supra note 10, at 431. See generally Gormley,
supra note 10, at 1350.
16
See Brenner, supra note 13, at __.
17
See id. at __.
18
See id. at __. See also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 198 (“[T]he
legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the commonlaw right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances and
applications of a general right to privacy, which properly understood afford a
remedy for the evils under consideration.”).
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technologies.
The need for a similar redefinition is even more pressing today,
as demonstrated by the national debate over privacy interests in
data maintained by health care providers, financial institutions and
retail merchants.19 Robert D. O’Harrow, Jr. has aptly captured the
public’s concern over data privacy:
Law enforcement and intelligence services don’t need to
design their own surveillance systems . . . . They only have
to reach out to the companies that already track us so well
while promising better service, security, efficiency, and,
perhaps most of all, convenience. It takes less and less
effort each year to know what each of us is about. When we
were at the coffee shop and where we went in our cars.
What we wrote online, who we spoke to on the phone, the
names of our friends and their friends and all the people
they know. When we rode the subway, the candidates we
supported, the books we read, the drugs we took, what we
had for dinner, how we like our sex.
More than ever before, the details about our lives are no
longer our own. They belong to the companies that collect
them, and the government agencies that buy or demand
them in the name of keeping us safe.20
19

See, e.g., ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSP., ONLINE PERSONAL PRIVACY ACT, S. REP. NO. 107-240 (2002) (Conf.
Rep.); DIV. OF FIN. PRACTICES, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., U.S. FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PRIVACY ON-LINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy
2000/privacy2000.pdf.
20
ROBERT D. O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 300 (Free Press) (2005).
Mr. O’Harrow is a reporter for The Washington Post and an associate of the
Center for Investigative Reporting. He was a Pulitzer Prize finalist for articles
on privacy and technology and a recipient of the 2003 Carnegie Mellon Cyber
Security Reporting Award. The concern is, of course, that Government could
apparently obtain such information by consent even though a number of federal
statutes impose restrictions on the dissemination of various types of personal
data. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45
C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2005); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 3405
(2005); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 15 U.S.C.S. § 6802(e)(8) (2005); Electronic
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Indeed, a recent survey of likely voters found that over 70%
favored more legislation to protect the privacy of their Internetrelated communications and data.21 What created this heightened
public concern? No doubt it was the creeping realization that data
retention by the businesses from which we purchase the vast
majority of our goods and services is not only pervasive, it is
unavoidable. Such pervasive technology affects us not only when
we venture into the public marketplaces, but it is intruding into our
homes at an increasing rate.22 As computer technology becomes a
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703 (2005). These and
similar statutory provisions are not determinative of the Fourth Amendment
issues discussed here because (a) the restrictions they impose are usually less
than those required by the Fourth Amendment and (b) they are far more fragile
than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Peter Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live
Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 916 (2004). What Congress gives, Congress can
take away. Public awareness is another issue: the average American is unlikely
to be aware of the provisions of these statutes (except, perhaps, to the extent that
some require one to fill out paperwork), but does have at least a pragmatic grasp
of Fourth Amendment guarantees.
21
CYBER SECURITY INDUSTRY ALLIANCE, SURVEY RESEARCH ON VOTER
ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNET SECURITY ISSUES (June 15, 2005),
https://www.csialliance.org/resources/pdfs/CSIA_Survey_on_Spyware_and_Ide
ntity_Theft_White_Paper.PDF.
22
See, e.g., “Pervasive Computing,” SeachNetworking.Com Definitions,
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/gDefinition/0,294236,sid7_gci759337,0
0.html [hereinafter Pervasive Computing Definition] (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
Pervasive computing is the trend towards increasingly ubiquitous . . .
connected computing devices in the environment, a trend being brought
about by a convergence of advanced electronic – and particularly,
wireless – technologies and the Internet. Pervasive computing devices
are not personal computers as we tend to think of them, but very tiny –
even invisible – devices, either mobile or embedded in almost any type
of object imaginable, including cars, tools, appliances, clothing and
various consumer goods – all communicating through increasingly
interconnected networks. According to Dan Russell, director of the
User Sciences and Experience Group at IBM’s Almaden Research
Center, by 2010 computing will have become so naturalized within the
environment that people will not even realize that they are using
computers. Russell and other researchers expect that in the future smart
devices all around us will maintain current information about their
locations, the contexts in which they are being used, and relevant data
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more and more embedded feature in every aspect of our lives, our
homes are becoming equipped with technology that can be used to
eavesdrop on our conversations and track our activities, even
though such data collection and retention is not a primary purpose
motivating its use.23 Indeed, such technology continues to be
successful in the marketplace only because its informationcollection aspects are overshadowed by the benefits it provides
Consumers.24
about the users.
Id.
23

See, e.g., Michael Kannellos, These Walls (and Teddy Bears) Have Eyes,
CNET NEWS, June 9, 2005, http://news.com.com/These+walls+and+teddy+
bears+have+eyes/2100-1040_3-5738029.html (describing presentations given at
Intel Corporation’s annual research day). Among the projects described were an
experimental system, consisting of a series of sensors under a baby’s mattress
and a camera mounted on a wall, which will monitor the child’s heart rate,
temperature and movement; stream video of the infant; take pictures and send all
the data to a parent’s PC or over the Internet to a remote location. Id. In another
experiment discussed at the conference, researchers tagged all of the items in a
person’s house with radio frequency identification sensors that effectively will
tell a remote computer whether the occupant has moved a spoon or turned on the
television. Id.
Dale Fuller, chief executive of Borland Software, recently described a
vision of the future in which a person who had too much wine with dinner might
find that his car might not start, and it might automatically call a cab, notify his
spouse and even reschedule business appointments early the next morning. Ted
Bridis, Top CEOs Describe Future Technologies, USA TODAY, June 10, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-06-10-tech-ceos_x.htm.
24
See, e.g., Mahesh S. Raisinghani, et al., Ambient Intelligence: Changing
Forms of Human-Computer Interaction and Their Social Implications, 5 J. OF
DIGITAL
INFO.
(2004),
available
at
http://jodi.ecs.soton.
ac.uk/Articles/v05/i04/Raisinghani/.
A young mother is on her way home, driving . . . with her 8-month old
daughter who is sleeping in her child seat on the passenger side of the
car. The infant is protected by an intelligent system called SBE 2
against airbag deployment, which could be fatal in the case of an
accident. SBE 2 detects when there is a child seat on the passenger seat
instead of a person and automatically disables the airbag. Arriving
home, a surveillance camera recognizes the young mother,
automatically disables the alarm, unlocks the front door as she
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For example, efforts are underway to develop “aware homes”
that incorporate intelligent, embedded systems which interact with
the occupants and with outside technology.25 An “aware home”
will “be able to recognize the people that live in it, adapt . . . to
them [and] learn from their behavior.”26 Similar systems will
become features of offices, hotel rooms and other environments.27
While the potential for abuses of the information-gathering
capabilities of such products is particularly dramatic, the nature
and sensitivity of the information gathered is often not inherently
different from that acquired by mundane Collectors such as
grocery and clothing retailers.28
Pervasive technology raises difficult issues about privacy,
especially for those who are not users of advanced technology.29
approaches it and turns on the lights to a level of brightness that the
home control system has learned she likes. After dropping off her
daughter, the young mother gets ready for grocery shopping. The
intelligent refrigerator has studied the family’s food consumption over
time and knows their preferences as well as what has been consumed
since the last time she went shopping. This information has been
recorded by an internal tracking system and wireless communication
with the intelligent kitchen cabinets. Based on this information, the
refrigerator automatically composes a shopping list, retrieves
quotations for the items on the list from five different supermarkets in
the neighborhood through an Internet link, sends an order to the one
with the lowest offer and directs the young mother there. When arriving
at the supermarket, the shopping cart has already been filled with the
items on her shopping list. Spontaneously, she decides to add three
more items to her cart and walks to the check-out. Instead of putting the
goods on a belt, the entire cart gets checked out simply by running it
past an RFID transponder that detects all items in the cart at once and
sends that information to the cash register for processing.
Id.
25

See, e.g., THE AWARE HOME, supra note 6; AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE,
supra note 6. See also Ward, supra note 6.
26
AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE, supra note 6. See Kannellos, supra note 23.
27
See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, SCENARIOS FOR AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE,
supra note 6.
28
See, e.g., Rob Walker, The Ad-Friendly World of Minority Report, June
24, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id=2067293.
29
See, e.g., Marc Langheinrich, Privacy by Design – Principles of Privacy-
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Most “old century” folks may think that their communications and
activities are private only insofar as they shield them from
observation by others. Such a view tends to associate “privacy”
with enclaves such as our homes, our cars and our offices.30 Those
Aware Ubiquitous Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD INT’L CONFERENCE
ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 273, 273 (G.D. Abowd et al. eds. 2001), available
at http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/publ/papers/privacy-principles. pdf.
What is it that makes ubiquitous computing any different from other
computer science domains with respect to privacy? . . . Four properties
come to mind:
Ubiquity: Ubiquitous computing is everywhere – this is its essence, its
explicit goal. Consequently, decisions made in ubiquitous system and
artifact design will affect large, if not every part of our lives, [sic] from
crossing a street to sitting in the living room to entering an office
building.
Invisibility: Not only should computers be everywhere, we want them
to actually disappear from our views. With the ever shrinking form
factor of computing and communication devices, this goal seems far
from being science fiction. Naturally, we will [sic] going to have a hard
time in the future deciding at what times we are interacting with (or are
under surveillance by) a computing or communication device.
Sensing: As computing technology shrinks and processing power
increases, so does the abilities [sic] of sensors to accurately perceive
certain aspects of the environment. Simple temperature, light, or noise
sensors have been around for quite some time, but next generation
sensors will allow high quality audio and video feeds from cameras and
microphones smaller than buttons. Even emotional aspects of our lives,
such as stress, fear, or excitement, could then be sensed with high
accuracy by sensors embedded in our clothings [sic] or in our
environment.
Memory amplification: Advancements in speech and video processing,
combined with the enhanced sensory equipment available soon, make it
actually feasible to perceive memory prosthesis, or amplifiers, which
can continuously and unobtrusively record every action, utterance and
movement of ourselves and our surroundings, feeding them into a
sophisticated back-end system that uses video and speech processing to
allow us browsing and searching through our past.
Id.
30

In the Roving Interception case, the FBI proceeded under Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351
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who are accustomed to using new technology, however, are rapidly
experiencing a decline in the privacy traditionally associated with
these enclaves. Cell phones have basically eliminated phone
booths, vehicles are equipped with surveillance technology,
wireless networks and cellular communications, and information
concerning much of what goes on in our homes can be obtained by
third parties. Offices may be somewhat more secure, but much of
our work takes place outside our offices; “road warriors” equipped
with the latest in wireless communication conduct business from—
and on their way to and from—other offices, and other places. The
notion of “private enclaves” as places separate and apart from the
world, areas in which our activities and communications are not
subject to observation, is disappearing.
In this world of ubiquitous, ambient technology, “an invisible
and comprehensive surveillance network” has been created, the
constituent parts of which are operated by private Collectors. This
network has effectively eradicated the distinction between “public”
and “private” spaces.31 Information that was historically secluded
behind physical barriers now has the potential to leak into the
public domain.
This emerging surveillance network has profound implications
for the way law enforcement agencies approach criminal
investigations. Historically, investigations involved locating the
(1968). Company v. United States (In re United States), 349 F.3d 1132, 1136
(9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Roving Interception]. Since Title III applies only
when one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications at
issue, the FBI either (i) operated on the assumption that the interior of the
vehicle was a “private” enclave requiring a warrant to access or (ii) proceeded
under Title III because the agents needed the cooperation of the Company to
exploit the System for eavesdropping purposes. Id. at 1136, 1145.
31
See Kannellos, supra note 23. See also O’HARROW, supra note 20, at
291.
Before long, our phones, laptop computers, PalmPilots, watches,
pagers, and much more will play parts in the most efficient surveillance
network ever made. Forget dropping a coin into a parking meter or
using a pay phone discreetly on the street. Those days are slipping by.
The most simple, anonymous transactions are now becoming datapoints
on the vast and growing matrix of each of our lives.
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presumptive situs of physical “evidence”32 and then taking
affirmative steps to find and seize that evidence.33 The scenario
had two notable characteristics. First, officers would traditionally
seek evidence of a specific crime which they believed had been
committed by a specific person; this focus circumscribed the scope
of their efforts.34 Second, officers would attempt to seek out and
collect evidence from places associated with the suspect (because
physical evidence necessarily resides in a “place”).35 Fourth
Amendment analysis has consequently focused on the interaction
between the officers and the suspect; the concern has been with
controlling the process by which officers intrude into that person’s
private spaces.36 The procedures devised to prevent “unwarranted”
intrusions into personal, private spaces including strict criteria for
obtaining search warrants supported by probable cause or an
exception and rules narrowing the scope of authorized searches
(i.e., the “plain view” doctrine), all reflect this.37 EvidenceId.
32

The “evidence” consists of items of tangible or intangible personal
property. This includes bodily substances. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
33
See Brenner, supra note 13, at notes __ & accompanying text.
34
See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (4th ed. 2005).
35
Law enforcement may also seek evidence from those associated with
suspects, as well as from suspects; indeed, officers may seek evidence from
“civilians,” i.e., those who have no involvement in the suspected criminal
activity. That does not alter the structure of the dynamic outlined above. In all of
these scenarios—law enforcement searches suspect’s premises, law enforcement
searches premises belonging to suspect’s associate and law enforcement
searches “civilian” premises—the inquiry is whether law enforcement violated
the privacy of the person or persons whose premises were the object of a search.
The focus is on law enforcement officers’ actively targeting someone’s premises
(Boyd) or activity (Katz) for scrutiny. See supra Part II(A). If the officers violate
someone’s privacy, they can move to suppress the evidence, if any, resulting
from the violation or bring a civil rights suit seeking damages for the violation.
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 554-56 (2004).
36
See Brenner, supra note 13, at notes __ & accompanying text.
37
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)-(d), (e); LAFAVE, supra note 34, §
2.2(a). This assumption is also embedded in Title III, the legislative product of
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gathering that does not intrude into such space is outside the
Fourth Amendment, at least as far as the object of the search is
concerned.38
Now, consider how this dynamic changes in a world of
ubiquitous technology. In many ways, surveillance and
investigation have merged. The data gathered by a surveillance
network of the type outlined above,39 along with the data
Consumers generate through online or wireless communication
activities, provide tremendous opportunities for law enforcement to
“round up the usual suspects” even before a specific crime is
reported.40 Instead of having to search for discrete bits of
Katz. Title III’s wiretap provisions specify that the transmission of the contents
of communications is not to be interrupted by “interception;” this is simply an
application of the Jackson principle. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 – 2522 (2005). See
also infra Part II.A. Instead of using an adhesive envelope, one relies upon
communication systems that, it has heretofore been reasonable to assume, are
“closed” to the general public. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice – Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Searching and Seizing Computers and
Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations § IV(A) (2002),
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm#_IVA_.
Since its enactment in 1968 . . . Title III has provided the statutory
framework that governs real-time electronic surveillance of the
contents of communications. When agents want to wiretap a suspect’s
phone, “keystroke” a hacker breaking into a computer system, or accept
the fruits of wiretapping by a private citizen who has discovered
evidence of a crime, the agents first must consider the implications of
Title III.
The structure of Title III is surprisingly simple. The statute’s drafters
assumed that every private communication could be modeled as a twoway connection between two participating parties, such as a telephone
call between A and B. At a fundamental level, the statute prohibits a
third party (such as the government) who is not a participating party to
the communication from intercepting private communications between
the parties using an “electronic, mechanical, or other device,” unless
one of several statutory exceptions applies.
Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2005).
38
See Brenner, supra note 13, at notes __ & accompanying text.
39
See supra notes 30–32 & accompanying text.
40
The data gathered by these sources can be divided into three broad
categories:
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(i) Tool Data
Tool data encompasses personal information that is valued not for its
content but for its utility. It includes Social Security numbers, dates of birth,
driver’s license numbers and other data; it will no doubt come to include
biometric identifiers such as DNA. Tool data is a given; it is not the product of
my will or effort but is assigned, more or less arbitrarily, to me. Tool data has
“value” because it is an implement that can be used for good or evil: My Social
Security number, for example, is a tool I can use to identify myself for various
benign purposes (positive value) and one a criminal can use to steal my identity
(negative value). See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1986).
Though tool data is something I “receive,” it is not inherently “public.” My
Social Security number and date of birth may be “public,” in that I have shared
them with others, but that is not inevitable; like the other types of tool data in
current circulation, they are “public” because we have not conceptualized tool
data as a commodity that has “value” and must therefore be protected. The need
for, and use of, tool data is a historical accident, an ad hoc solution to the
complexity of modern society; we use tool data to identify (“I am Susan
Brenner”) and authenticate (“Here is proof I am Susan Brenner”). See, e.g.,
BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR 182-95 (2003). For most of human history,
these functions were relational; people were born, raised and lived their lives in
the same community, where everyone knew and recognized them. See generally
id. at 184. As populations became increasingly mobile and urbanized, relational
identification and authentication no longer sufficed; it became necessary to find
some surrogate, and that is what Social Security numbers, driver’s licenses and
other personal data became. See, e.g., Matt Sundeen, License to Drive = Proof
of Identity, STATE LEGISLATURES, Apr. 2003, at 21.
(ii) Biographical Data
Biographical data derives from my activities in real- and cyber-space; it
includes where I live and where I have lived, where I work and where I have
worked, the car I drive, the routines I follow and the places and people I visit.
Biographical data is considered “public” because it is the product of my
behavior in “public” places, where what I do can be observed by anyone who
shares that space with me. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001
(N.H. 2003). Consequently, biographical data, defined as information which was
or could have been obtained by observing activity in a “public” place, is not
private under Katz or under cognate tests used to implement civil privacy
protections. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983);
Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1009. As Part II explained, the implementation of
ubiquitous technology makes the assumptions underlying this category
increasingly problematic because it is based on a purely spatial bifurcation of
“public” and “private.”
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(iii) Transactional Data
Transactional data is generated by our interactions with others. In analyzing
the privacy of transactional data, it is useful to divide it into two types: (a)
professional transactional data, which results from interactions with attorneys,
physicians, religious advisors, psychiatrists, accountants and other professionals;
and (b) commercial transactional data, which results from interactions with
those who provide commercial goods or services offline or online. There are
certain constants across these categories: Each generates data which establishes
(i) that I interacted with a particular professional or commercial resource on one
or more occasions, (ii) the nature of that interaction (seeking legal advice,
making a purchase) and (iii) the details of that interaction (seeking legal advice
about an estate, purchasing vitamins or electronics or clothing). None of this
data is private under the Katz test or cognate civil standards because by
interacting with external entities (human or automated) I have knowingly
exposed (i)-(iii) to public view; I assumed the risk that those with whom I
interact will reveal the details of that interaction to others.
There can be some overlap between transactional data and biographical
data. To understand why, it is useful to consider two real-world transactions: In
the first, I consult with an attorney whose office is in my neighborhood; in the
second, I purchase a prescription from a pharmacist at my local drug store. My
traveling to the law office and to the drug store takes place in “public,” and so
can be considered biographical data. It is also transactional data insofar as it
shows that I interacted with the lawyer and with the pharmacist. These
respective encounters differ somewhat in the extent to which the nature and
details of the interactions are biographical. My purchasing a prescription from
the pharmacist takes place in “public,” and so the nature of the transaction tends
toward the biographical; but the details of the purchase will remain confidential
unless I choose to share them or unless the pharmacist is indiscreet enough to
announce the nature and uses of the medication I buy. Since it is reasonable to
infer that I went to a law office to obtain legal advice, the nature of that
transaction also tends towards the biographical; but since the transaction itself
does not take place in “public,” the details do not constitute biographical data.
The law has treated the categories differently: Professional interactions are
usually encompassed by privileges that bar the professional from revealing
details of the interaction without the client’s permission; the purpose is to
provide confidentiality when it is “essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relationship between the parties.” PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN &
SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1.1 (2d ed. 2004). For
commercial interactions, the general rule is that “the facts of a transaction
belong jointly and severally to the participants. If Alice buys a chattel from Bob,
ordinarily both Alice and Bob are free to disclose this fact.” A. Michael
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information from a disjointed array of physical sources, officers
can “harvest” information held by these private Collectors.41 The
harvest can occur either as a result of Government’s purchase of
Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1521-22 (2000)
(noting that a “very small number of statutes impose limits upon the sharing of
private transactional data collected by persons not classed as professionals”).
Neither type of transactional data is private in the constitutional-common law
sense, but the evidentiary and other constraints American law places on the
dissemination of data resulting from professional interactions limit its
circulation to those involved in the professional consultation; therefore, while
professional transactional data is not private, it is secured.
41
See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible
Handshake: The Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶¶ 2-3 (2003).
The Internet was initiated by the State, and soon after was
privatized . . . . Market powers . . . facilitated the rise of new
players . . . who gained power and control in the information
environment . . . . A convergence of interests seems to be developing
among players such as copyright owners and service providers on the
one hand, and the State’s growing interest in the digital environment,
on the other hand. Law enforcement agencies seek to enhance their
monitoring capacity and online businesses seek to prevent fraud and
combat piracy while strengthening their ties with authorities. This
convergence might lead to an unholy alliance with potentially
troublesome results . . . .
The most explicit example . . . is reflected in a presentation by Joseph
E. Sullivan, director of compliance and law enforcement relations at
eBay. Addressing law enforcement agents at a conference on
cybercrime, Sullivan offered to hand over information, when
requested . . . . eBay is one of the largest online e-commerce
businesses, and the owner of PayPal, which provides clearing services
for online financial transactions. eBay controls access to a colossal
amount of information, including financial records, names, user IDs
and passwords, affiliations, e-mail addresses, physical addresses,
shipping information, contact information, and transaction information
(i.e., bidding history, prices paid, feedback rating). But eBay is not
alone in implementing law enforcement-friendly policy. The emerging
regime of recent years facilitates cooperation between the State and the
private sector in law enforcement efforts, beyond the reach of judicial
review.
Id.
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data or from a “request.” Either way, the Government’s ability to
obtain and sift huge amounts of Consumer data without any reason
to believe a crime has been committed dwarfs anything that could
have been accomplished by the general warrant procedure that led
to adoption of the Fourth Amendment.42
A fairly recent Ninth Circuit case illustrates how far we have
come. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of
42

Brenner, supra note 13, at __. See Florence Olsen, Lawmakers Have
Tough Questions for Largely Unregulated Data Firms, Federal Computer Week
(Apr. 25, 2005), http://www.fcw.com/ article88676.
FBI officials spent $75 million last year for information from data
aggregators, a fast-growing and largely unregulated market . . . .
The FBI buys information from data aggregators ChoicePoint, credit
bureau reporting companies, Dun and Bradstreet, LexisNexis, the
National Insurance Crime Bureau and Westlaw, which agents use
mainly for convenience, said Chris Swecker, assistant director of the
FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division.
“Twenty-three years ago when I first came to the FBI, I had to walk
down to the courthouse to get courthouse records and go other places to
collect these records,” Swecker said. “Being able to make one query
and get all these records at one time saves investigative time and saves
resources,” he said.
Records that the FBI finds useful include driver’s license
information, last known address, date of birth, court filings, liens and
newspaper records, Swecker said, adding that FBI officials conducted
1.2 million queries in the ChoicePoint database in 2004.
Privacy experts say federal agencies’ use of commercial databases
creates a problem. “It allows them . . . to outsource data-collection
activities,” said James Dempsey, executive director of the . . . Center
for Democracy and Technology. If federal officials start a new
collection of data, they must comply with the Privacy Act, which
requires agencies to perform a privacy impact assessment, Dempsey
told the committee. But when government officials buy that data or
subscribe to data that they don’t pull into a government database, none
of the Privacy Act rules apply, Dempsey said . . . .
Sen. Russell Feingold . . . said he is concerned there are no
guidelines to ensure that information in commercial databases is used
responsibly. Without restrictions, there is nothing to prevent federal
agencies from using commercial data “for privacy-intrusive datamining programs,” he said.
Id.
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Oral Communications43 arose from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s efforts to use technology integrated into a private
vehicle to intercept conversations taking place within it.44 As the
Ninth Circuit explained, some vehicles are equipped with
“telecommunication devices” that assist with navigation or with
“emergencies or obtaining road-side assistance. Such systems
operate via a combination of GPS . . . and cellular technology.”45
The appellant in the case (the Company) operated one such service
(the System).46 One feature of the System let the Company open a
cellular connection to a vehicle and listen to conversations in the
car.47 The purpose was to help recover stolen vehicles, but it could
also be used to eavesdrop on legitimate conversations conducted in
a vehicle equipped with the System.48 Realizing this, the FBI
obtained “orders requiring the Company to assist in intercepting
conversations taking place in a car equipped with the System.”49
The FBI in effect “harvested” the conversations held in the
target vehicle. This case highlights issues we will face as
technology becomes an increasingly pervasive feature of our
lives.50 We have for many decades assumed that a vehicle is a
private place; fictional characters often take advantage of the
privacy a vehicle offers to discuss sensitive matters.51 The privacy
43

349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
Law enforcement installation of listening devices in vehicles is far from
novel. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (detailing how in
1959, federal agents installed a “Schmidt radio transmitter” under the front seat
of a car and used it to listen in on conversations held by the occupants of the
vehicle).
45
Roving Interception, 349 F.3d at 1133.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1133-34.
49
Id. at 1134.
50
See, e.g., Centre for Pervasive Computing, http://www.pervasive.dk/.
51
In the Roving Interception case, the court focused exclusively on a
specific statutory structure created for the authorization and implementation of
wiretaps, so the question of whether the interior of the vehicle was a “private”
place was not raised, though it was presumably assumed. Roving Interception,
349 F.3d at 1133.
44
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of vehicles has, of course, been compromised on occasion;52 while
we might be aware, at some level, that cars could be “bugged,” we
could not imagine that our vehicles would themselves become
instruments of surveillance.
If cars can become instruments of surveillance, what about our
homes? The case discussed above illustrates a trend—the
pervasiveness of technology—that will surely find its way into our
homes.53 As computer technology increasingly becomes
entrenched in every phase of our lives, our homes, too, will come
equipped with technology that can be used to eavesdrop on our
conversations and track our activities; interactive electronic
devices will be embedded in appliances, clothing, furniture and the
home itself.54 Interacting with these embedded technologies will
become a necessary and inevitable aspect of our lives; our home
will regulate the internal environment, order groceries and arrange
for other essential services without being asked to do so.55 While
these technologies will make our lives easier, they will also
52

See supra note 43-49 & accompanying text.
See, e.g., Pervasive Computing Definition, supra note 22.
54
See Kannellos, supra note 23 & accompanying text. See also Marc
Langheinrich et al., Living in a Smart Environment: Implications for the Coming
Ubiquitous Information Society, 15 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REV. 5 (Feb. 2005),
available at http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/publ/papers/sktelecom 2005.pdf.
By virtue of its very definitions, the vision of ubiquitous computing has
the potential to create an invisible and comprehensive surveillance
network, covering an unprecedented share of our public and private
life: “The old sayings that ‘the walls have ears’ and ‘if these walls
could talk’ have become the disturbing reality. The world is filled with
all-knowing, all-reporting things.” . . . Today’s economic reality –
shopping without participating in comprehensive profiling [–] . . .
might become an expensive luxury for well-off citizens.
(quoting R. Lucky, Everything Will Be Connected To Everything Else, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Mar. 1999), http://www.argreenhouse.com/papers/rlucky/ spectrum/
connect.shtml).
55
See, e.g., Kelly Greene, Take A Glimpse Inside the Home of the Future,
REAL
ESTATE
JOURNAL
(May
24,
2004),
http://www.
realestatejournal.com/housegarden/indoorliving/20040524-greene.html. See also
Mark Weiser, Open House (Mar 1996), http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/
~matthew/lectures/HCI4/ weiserOpenhouse.pdf.
53
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“broadcast” personal information to a variety of external sources.
Like the System, this technology will be included because it
has other valuable uses.56 And like the System, much of this
technology will operate below our personal radar; that is, like the
driver and passengers upon whom the FBI eavesdropped, we will
remain unaware that embedded technology is tracking and
preserving the details of our actions, our conversations and even
our vital signs.
With pervasive technology, the focus on privacy shifts from
intrusions into spaces under the Consumer’s temporary or
permanent control, to the acquisition of information from sources
over which the Consumer has contractual rights but no effective ex
ante control or even a right of access to the database containing the
stored information.57 This “harvesting” scenario represents a
twenty-first century variation of the “assault on the castle” scenario

56

See, e.g., Raisinghani, supra note 24.
We do not mean to suggest that this information “harvesting” scenario
will supplant the traditional dynamic of Government intrusions into privacy. We
are physical beings and, as such, will continue to act, and to generate physical
evidence, in the real-world; the primary locus of evidence for traditional crimes
such as rape, murder and drug trafficking will no doubt remain in the real-world.
But even those crimes may involve stored transactional data. See, e.g., Eric
Weslander, Web Evidence Used in Murder Hearing, LAWRENCE JOURNALWORLD (Kansas), Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://www.ljworld.com/section/
crime_fire/story/189998.
The case of a Kansas State University professor charged with
murdering his ex-wife headed into uncharted legal territory Thursday as
prosecutors presented evidence of an Internet search history from the
suspect’s computers . . . .
57

A Lawrence Police detective who examined computers seized from
Thomas E. Murray testified that in the month before Carmin D. Ross’
killing, Murray’s computers had been used to search the Internet for
phrases that included “how to hire an assassin,” “how to kill someone
quickly and quietly” and “how to murder someone and not get caught.”
Id. The detective “testified that even though Murray appeared to use his
computer regularly on Thursday mornings, there was virtually no file activity on
Murray’s computers the morning of Nov. 13, 2003, the day prosecutors allege
he drove to Lawrence and stabbed and beat Ross to death.” Id.
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that ultimately prompted the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.58
To understand this scenario, and its relationship to the
“harvesting” scenario, we need to briefly review the history of the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is intended to protect
the sanctity of private property from intrusions by public
officials;59 its concern with protecting private property derives
from common law.
Early English common law punished “those who invaded a
neighbor’s premises.”60 By the twelfth century housebreaking was
one “of the more serious crimes in medieval England,” and by the
sixteenth century English law had developed specific prohibitions
against housebreaking, burglary and trespass.61 These laws were
concerned only with trespasses by private persons because official
searches of private premises were almost unknown until the
fifteenth century.62 In the latter half of the fifteenth century, the
King and Parliament began authorizing trade guilds to “enter and
search the workmanship of all manner of persons” to enforce guild
regulations.63 Roughly a century later, the Court of the Star
Chamber, charged with licensing books and regulating printing
[D]ecreed that the wardens of the Stationers’ Company . . .
should have authority to open all packs and trunks of
papers and books brought into the country, to search in any
warehouse, shop, or any other place where they suspected a
violation of the laws of printing to be taking place [and] to

58

See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1999).
See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
60
See, e.g., William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and
Original Meaning 32 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont
Graduate School) (on file with author).
61
Id. at 31-35.
62
Id. at 36, 75. A law enacted in 1335 required innkeepers in ports to
search guests for counterfeit money; the innkeepers kept a portion of whatever
they found and turned the rest over to “official searchers” who took the rest and
monitored the innkeepers’ discharge of this obligation. See LASSON, supra note
5, at 23.
63
See LASSON, supra note 5, at 24.
59

BRENNER MACROED.DOC

4/18/2006 12:35 PM

PRIVACY RIGHTS IN TRANSACTIONAL DATA

235

seize the books printed contrary to law.”64
Other courts followed suit, issuing edicts authorizing similar
searches directed at those suspected of libel, heresy and political
dissent.65 This led to the evolution of the general warrant, which
these courts issued with no proof of individualized suspicion and in
which no “names are specified . . . and . . . a discretionary power
was given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may
chance to fall.”66 As arbitrary searches became more common,
“Englishmen began to insist that their houses were castles for the
paradoxical reason that the castle-like security that those houses
had afforded from intrusion was vanishing.”67
In the eighteenth century, English courts responded to citizens’
concern about “assaults on their castles” by issuing a series of
decisions that held that homes were protected from arbitrary action
by government officials.68 Most of these decisions grew out of one
infamous investigation of seditious libel. Ordered to find the author
of a recently-published letter, officers acting under the authority of
a general warrant searched five houses and made a number of
arrests.69 Those whose homes were searched sued the officers who
conducted the searches for trespass, and the government
“undertook the responsibility of defending all actions arising from
the warrant and the payment of all judgments.”70 To the delight of
64

Id. at 25. The Stationers’ Company was a guild of printers charged with
enforcing the Star Chamber’s restrictions on printing. See, e.g., TELFORD
TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 25 (1969).
65
See LASSON, supra note 5, at 25-27. “No limitations seem to have been
observed in giving messengers powers of search . . . in ferreting out . . .
evidence. Persons and places were not necessarily specified, seizure of papers
and effects was indiscriminate, everything was left to the discretion of the bearer
of the warrant.” Id. at 26. See also Cuddihy, supra note 60, at 100-19.
66
LASSON, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(C.P. 1763)).
67
Cuddihy, supra note 60, at 128. See LASSON, supra note 5, at 30-45.
68
See Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1765); Entick v.
Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 489; Huckle v.
Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
69
See LASSON, supra note 5, at 43-45.
70
Id. at 45.
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the British public, the plaintiffs won, and their verdicts were
upheld on appeal.71 Encouraged by their success, John Entick, the
victim of a similar search, sued the officers who searched his home
for trespass and won a verdict of £300.72 The Court of Common
Pleas upheld the verdict:
Our law holds the property of every man so sacred that no
man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his
leave; if he does, he is a trespasser . . . . The defendants
have no right to avail themselves of . . . these warrants . . . .
[W]e can safely say there is no law in this country to justify
the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it
would destroy all the comforts of society.73
The effect of the Entick opinion and other decisions was to apply
the same standard to public and private actors: In either instance, a
trespasser could be held civilly liable for entering another’s
property “without a lawful authority.”74
The English notion that “a man’s house was his castle” came to
America with the colonists.75 “Between 1754 and 1788, Americans
often resorted to house-as-castle rhetoric in condemning excise
taxes, general warrants and writs of assistance, a type of those
warrants that was used to collect import duties.”76 The colonists
were particularly outraged by the writs of assistance, and waged an
unsuccessful legal battle against them during this period.77 The
resentment these writs generated was a driving factor in the
Revolution and, later, in the adoption of bills of rights by states and
71

See id. at 44-46.
See id. at 47. See also Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 807-08.
73
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817.
74
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, III COMMENTARIES ON ENGLISH LAW 163,
(William Morrison, ed., 2001).
75
See Cuddihy, supra note 60, at xcvi (“[T]he familiar quotation appeared
in the colonies no later than 1647, in Rhode Island’s first code of laws.”).
76
Id. at xcvii.
77
See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 5, 51-61. “[A]ny person who was
authorized by a writ of assistance” was permitted to “search any house, shop,
warehouse, etc.; break open doors, chests, packages, . . . and remove any
prohibited or uncustomed goods or merchandise.” Id. at 53.
72
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by the federal government.78 The Fourth Amendment was
therefore a product of the same concerns that resulted in the law of
trespass being applied to public actors: “to guard individuals
against improper intrusion into their buildings where they had the
exclusive right of possession.”79 It was intended to secure spatial
privacy—to restrict law enforcement’s ability to break down doors
and rummage through rooms, boxes, chests and drawers.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THIRD PARTY RECORDS AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
We now turn to the Supreme Court’s approach to the privacy
of third party records, which arose in situations far different from
that presented by current electronic database technology. The
sections below address that approach in two steps. Section A
describes how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment’s applicability to searches and seizures of
transactional records held by third parties in light of twentieth
century technological advances.80 Section B explains why that
78

See id. at 51-61, 79-82. See also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 310-11 (1978) (“[The] Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large
measure out of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance . . . [that]
granted sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to
search at large for smuggled goods.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
79
Jones v. Gibson, 1 N.H. 266, 272 (1818).
80
The discussion of Supreme Court cases in this section is selective: It is
limited to cases that have dealt with the use of new communicative technologies,
as defined in note 1, supra. The Court has used the Katz standard to decide
whether a wide variety of police conduct constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding
that it is not a search for police to fly over a greenhouse in a helicopter and
observe marijuana plants through gaps in its roof); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that it is not a search for police to fly over a
backyard in commercial airspace and view marijuana being grown there); Dow
Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that it is not a
search to fly over a chemical plant and photograph the premises). The
“technologies” at issue in these cases were simply tools police used to gain a
favorable physical vantage point from which to make observations with the
unaided, or aided, naked eye; these cases did not involve the type of pervasive,
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approach is inadequate to protect the societal interest in
maintaining the privacy of digital transactional data.
A. Third Party Records and Twentieth Century Technology
The Supreme Court has addressed the application of the Fourth
Amendment to communicative technologies only a handful of
times in the last fifty years. Even more disappointing is that the
Court has addressed these issues in an inconsistent and
unprincipled manner.81 The foundational case is Katz v. United
States,82 a 1967 case in which the Court held that warrantless
Government wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby
overruling its 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States.83
Katz was convicted of violating 18 U.S. Code § 1084, which
makes it a crime to use facilities of interstate commerce to transmit
wagering information.84 The conviction was based on six tape
recordings which were obtained by means of an electronic
listening device attached to the outside of the public telephone
booth.85 The authorities conducted the eavesdropping after
discovering that Katz used these phones to call a know gambler.
Notwithstanding this information, the authorities made no effort to
obtain judicial authorization for the eavesdropping.86
Katz raised two issues in his appeal, both of which involved the
relationship between the Fourth Amendment and a
“constitutionally protected area.”87 The Court declined to accept
autonomous technologies analyzed in this article.
81
For an extensive examination of the Court’s decisions addressing privacy
interests as affected by advances in communicative technologies, see Brenner,
supra note 13, at __.
82
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
84
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49.
85
Id. at 354 n.14.
86
Electronic Surveillance, 82 HARV. L. REV. 187, 187-88 (1968).
87
Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-51. To this point in history, Fourth Amendment
violations occurred only when there was a physical trespass onto a
“constitutionally protected area.” See, e.g., Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and
Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 793 n.20 (1999). In an attempt to come within that
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his formulation, explaining that the resolution of “Fourth
Amendment problems is not . . . promoted by incantation of the
phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’”88 The majority went on to
announce a new Fourth Amendment standard:
[T]he parties have attached great significance to the . . .
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls.
The petitioner has . . . argued that the booth was a
“constitutionally protected area.” The government has
maintained . . . that it was not. But this effort . . . deflects
attention from the problem presented by this case. For the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.89
In an important concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated the
standard that has been used in later decisions to implement the
Katz holding:90
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.” The question . . . is what
protection it affords to those people . . . . My understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
doctrine, Katz argued that when he
occupied [the phone booth] for the purpose of engaging in a personal
conversation and closed the door to the booth, he [was] in effect in his
own residence. By invitation from the telephone company and the
payment of the toll he says he is entitled to consider the booth protected
from intrusion by the Fourth Amendment.
Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 133 (9th Cir. 1966), reversed by 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
88
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
89
Id. at 351 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
90
The Court adopted Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and has applied it ever since.
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second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus a man’s home is, for
most purposes, a place where he expects privacy . . . . On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be
protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.91
Katz, of course, involved the interception of the contents of
communications between two individuals, not government seizures
of records held by third parties. But since the Katz Court
characterized its holding as the general standard that would be used
to determine whether a Fourth Amendment right to privacy
existed, Katz shaped how the Court approaches third-party records,
as well as real-time personal communications.
In the next dozen years, the Supreme Court twice considered
whether the Fourth Amendment applies when Government obtains
records pertaining to an individual that are generated and held by a
party with whom the individual has commercial dealings. In the
parlance of this article, the question was whether Government
could obtain without a warrant Data generated and maintained by a
Collector reflecting transactions between the Collector and the
Consumer/defendant. In United States v. Miller,92 Miller, who had
been indicted on tax charges, moved to suppress records
concerning his bank account; federal agents had obtained the
records by using a grand jury subpoena, not a warrant.93 The Court
91

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It is
important to note that Justice Harlan interpreted the majority’s opinion as
holding “only” (i) that a telephone booth is an area in which one “has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy;” (ii) that electronic
invasions, as well as physical invasions, of such an area can violate the Fourth
Amendment; and (iii) that the invasion of a “constitutionally protected area”
without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 360-61. His standard
therefore implicitly incorporates the spatially-based conception of privacy that
had prevailed since Olmstead. Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928). This
is evident in his comment that the rule he cites “emerged from prior decisions.”
See supra note 91 & accompanying text. Those decisions were, by necessity,
based on Olmstead’s trespass doctrine.
92
425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
93
Id. at 437.
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the agents had
“improperly circumvented” his Fourth Amendment rights.94 The
Supreme Court in 1976 disagreed: “We find that there was no
intrusion into any area in which respondent had a protected Fourth
Amendment interest and that the District Court therefore correctly
denied respondent’s motion to suppress.”95 This post-Katz Court
cited a pre-Katz opinion for the proposition that “‘no interest
legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment’ is implicated by
governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion
into a zone of privacy, into ‘the security a man relies upon when he
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area.’”96 Katz, of course, rejected the use of “constitutionally
protected area” as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment privacy.
The Miller Court also noted that “the documents subpoenaed here
are not respondent’s ‘private papers.’ . . . [R]espondent can assert
neither ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the business
records of the banks.”97
In Miller, the Court clearly misapplied its own precedent. First
its focus on a “constitutionally protected area” ignored Katz’s
statement that the Fourth Amendment protects “people and not
places.”98 Second, by focusing on the owner of property, the Court
ignored the holding of United States v. Matlock99 that the
protections of the Fourth Amendment do not rest upon the law of
94

Id. at 438.
Id. at 440.
96
Id. (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966)).
97
Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. The Miller Court’s only references to Katz came
in the paragraph in which it addressed Miller’s reliance on the Katz Court’s
statement that “we have . . . departed from the narrow view” that “‘property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize.’” 425 U.S. at
442 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (quoting Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). The Miller Court dismissed this aspect of
Katz, noting that the Katz Court “stressed that ‘[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.’”
425 U.S. at 442 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). The Miller Court then
proceeded to base its holding on the Katz “assumption of risk” principle. Id.
98
See supra note 89 & accompanying text.
99
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
95
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property, “with its attendant historical and legal refinements.”100
The question the Court should have addressed was not to whom
the records belonged, but whether it is in our society’s interest to
condition a Consumer’s use of the nation’s banking system on a
waiver of his Fourth Amendment privacy.
Three years later, the Court decided Smith v. Maryland.101
Smith was the “other half” of Katz; the issue was “whether the
installation and use of a pen register,” which captures the numbers
dialed on a telephone, “constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.”102 The Smith Court began its opinion by
reviewing Katz and noting that the standard used to implement
Katz is the two-pronged test Justice Harlan enunciated in his
concurring opinion: (i) whether the individual has exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy in the thing, place or endeavor;
and (ii) whether society is prepared to regard the individual’s
subjective expectation of privacy, if any, as reasonable.103
The Court found that Smith met neither criterion:
Since the pen register was installed on telephone company
property at the telephone company’s central offices,
petitioner . . . cannot claim that his “property” was invaded
or that police intruded into a “constitutionally protected
area.” Petitioner’s claim . . . is that, notwithstanding the
absence of a trespass, the State . . . infringed a “legitimate
expectation of privacy”. . . . [A] pen register differs . . .
from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen
registers
do
not
acquire
the
contents
of
100

Id. at 172 n.7. The issue in Matlock was whether one’s authority to
consent to a search by law enforcement derived from a property interest in the
place or thing to be searched. Id. The case involved the validity of a consent to
search given by the co-occupant of a house. Id. at 166. Since the co-occupant
was neither the owner nor the lessor of the property, her consent to search would
not have been valid if the authority to consent was a function of her having a
property interest in the house. As noted above, the Supreme Court rejected this
narrow interpretation of one’s authority to consent to a search, to an invasion of
privacy, in favor of a broader standard. Id. at 172.
101
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
102
Id. at 736.
103
Id. at 740. See infra Part II.B.3.
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communications . . .
[P]etitioner’s argument that its installation and use
constituted a “search” necessarily rests upon a claim that he
had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” regarding the
numbers he dialed on his phone . . . .
[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All
telephone users realize that they must “convey” phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed. All subscribers realize . . . that the phone
company has facilities for making permanent records of the
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance
(toll) calls on their monthly bills . . . . Telephone users, in
sum, typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company; that the phone company
has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a
variety of legitimate business purposes. Although
subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is
too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these
circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret.104
The Court also rejected Smith’s claim that he demonstrated a
subjective expectation of privacy by making the calls from his
home,105 and held that, even if he could show such a subjective
104

Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-43 (citations omitted).
Id. at 743.
[T]he site of the call is immaterial . . . . Although petitioner’s conduct
may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation
private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to
preserve the privacy of the number he dialed. Regardless of his
location, petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone
company . . . if he wished to complete his call. The fact that he dialed
the number on his home phone rather than on some other phone could
make no conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber rationally
think that it would.
105
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expectation, it is not one society would regard as reasonable:
“[E]ven if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that
the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this
expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” The Court went on to state that it has consistently
held “that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”106
Smith, therefore, suffers from the same weakness as Miller. It
applies an assumption of the risk rationale to a situation in which
the Consumer actually has no choice but to forego privacy
expectations unless he is willing to forego a material, if not
practically essential, service.107
The Supreme Court has applied the Miller-Smith principle in a
variety of cases.108 It summarized the rationale for the principle in
United States v. Jacobsen:
[W]hen an individual reveals private information to
another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal
that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of
that information. Once frustration of the original
expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does
Id.
106

Id. at 743-44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))
(citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-44).
107
Smith is also distinguishable on its facts from most of the situations we
address. The Court based its decision in large part on the fact that subscribers
had to know from their bills that the phone company kept records of numbers
dialed. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. The same assumption cannot be made about the
extent to which Consumers understand or appreciate the nature of data
collection or mining or the extent to which database technology can compile and
aggregate information about disparate transactions.
108
See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) (applying
Smith’s assumption of risk analysis to hold it was not a search for police to fly
over individual’s back yard to discover marijuana plants); S.E.C. v. Jerry T.
O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 735-36, 743 (1984) (holding that Miller foreclosed
“respondents from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third parties is
necessary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional search or seizure of his
papers”).
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not prohibit governmental use of the now non-private
information . . . . The Fourth Amendment is implicated
only if the authorities use information with respect to which
the expectation of privacy has not already been
frustrated.109
The Jacobsen Court therefore construed privacy as an ephemeral
concept—as something that vanishes absolutely once access to
information has been shared with others. In short, the Court has
applied an assumption of risk analysis that makes informational
privacy a purely zero-sum (i.e., private or not-private) concept. A
Consumer who fails to keep information solely to herself loses all
Fourth Amendment protection. This is, as we explained above,
applying an eighteenth-century bricks-and-mortar conception of
privacy to a world that has been, and is being, fundamentally
altered by rapidly-evolving, pervasive technologies.110
B. The Inadequacy of Twentieth Century Analysis for TwentyFirst Century Technology
Miller and Smith evince an unarticulated assumption that the
Fourth Amendment conception of privacy is zero-sum. If that were
true, then Consumers have no control over the information they
(knowingly, unknowingly, willingly or unwillingly) provide to
others regardless of the extent to which that information is personal
or private and whether it is required for the purchase of goods or
services that are necessary or even desirable for meaningful
participation in twenty-first century society. In other words, as
computer technology becomes more embedded in society,
consumers will be increasingly forced to waive their Fourth
109

466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (emphasis added). The issue in Jacobsen was
the propriety of law enforcement agents’ observing evidence that had been
brought to their attention by private parties. Id. at 111. The Court held,
essentially, that since the private parties’ observation of the evidence had
already compromised Jacobsen’s privacy interest in it, the subsequent viewing
by law enforcement did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 118-19.
110
See supra notes 1-5 & accompanying text.
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Amendment rights in order to obtain vital goods and services. We
must consider, therefore, whether the Supreme Court’s approach is
justified.
With all due respect to the Court, we submit that its zero-sum
construct reflects at least five errors. First, it ignores the sound
two-pronged approach of Katz. Second, it wrongly assumes that
the mere transmittal of data constitutes a disclosure of information.
Third, it erroneously concludes that a disclosure to a person who
has promised to maintain the confidentiality of that information is
a disclosure to the public.111 Fourth, it would apply the assumption
of risk construct even when (a) the Consumer enters into a
transaction by which she does not accept that risk and (b) the
disclosure is an inherent component of a socially beneficial or
necessary relationship such that she would have to forego that
relationship to avoid the disclosure.112 Fifth, holding that the
consent of a Collector to a Government request for information
overcomes the Consumer’s privacy interest reflects an
inappropriate balancing of society’s interest in privacy versus
Government’s interest in investigation. The sections below outline
our analysis of each of these issues.
111

The Court did not focus in Miller or Smith on the contractual interests of
the Consumer or the Collector. The analysis appears to have been more akin to a
tort concept of assumption of the risk. We note that the fact that a Consumer
might have a claim for breach of contract against the Collector who discloses
private Data should not affect the issues addressed here if only because (i) any
contractual remedy would come too late to protect the Consumer’s privacy
interest and (ii) it would be extremely difficult to translate the harm to the
Consumer into monetary damages.
112
Thus, disclosures to third parties such as Internet Service Providers,
health insurers and smart home services vendors differ fundamentally from the
types of disclosures that Warren and Brandeis addressed. The Warren-Brandeis
article was concerned with disclosures made that were made to other people by
chance, i.e., by being in a particular place at a particular time. One could argue
that the element of choice is missing, but there is another difficulty with
assuming privacy in this context: The complained-of information (photography,
description of what someone did) was gathered in an ostentatiously public
place—a street, a restaurant, a hotel, etc. It is, after all, inevitable that certain of
our actions will occur in public spaces; we cannot insist that our every action is
private and must be ignored.
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1. Application of the Katz Two-Part Test Supports Fourth
Amendment Protection to Collector-Stored Data
As noted above,113 the Supreme Court in Smith accepted
Justice Harlan’s formulation of the Katz holding as the standard
governing Fourth Amendment privacy analysis: “My
understanding of the rule . . . is that there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”114
113

See supra note 111 & accompanying text.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. The Court in Smith calls Katz the “lodestar” for
determining the application of the Fourth Amendment and specifically
recognized the accuracy of the Harlan restatement:
This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence,
normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the
individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy,”—whether, in the words of the Katz majority,
the individual has shown that “he seeks to preserve [something] as
private.” The second question is whether the individual’s subjective
expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable,’”—whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the
individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is “justifiable” under the
circumstances.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740-41 (citations and note omitted). Note that Justice
Blackmun in Smith inserts the term “viewed objectively” in stating the Katz
holding, whereas Katz used no such term but instead appears to be referring to
“justifiable” in the sense of consistent with societal interests. Thus, Katz’s
holding is stated as follows:
The government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search
and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. Immediately following, the Court explained its rationale:
One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public
telephone has come to play in private communication.
114
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Miller and Smith, however, ignore that formulation in favor of
a single-pronged assumption of risk test. In so doing, they ignore
fundamental safeguards intrinsic in the two-part test. The
“subjective” element has historical roots that predate even the
Constitution.115 Those roots demonstrate that the only justifiable
substantive qualification of the subjective element is that it is
evaluated in light of all facts and circumstances known to the
Consumer.116 The reason for this should be obvious. Although the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to promote reasonable
Government action, even reasonable Government action is
subordinate to society’s interest in honoring generally accepted
expectations as to what is, and what is not, private.
Miller and Smith depart from that subjective standard by
applying an objective test based on what judges think reasonably
knowledgeable citizens know. Thus, in holding that a bank
customer assumes the risk of providing information to his bank,
the Court is really saying that the customer’s expectation that his
records will remain private is categorically unreasonable. That is
not a valid assessment of the customer’s subjective assessment of
risk, however, but an objective evaluation.
Nor can the Miller-Smith assumption of risk test be justified on
the basis of the second, objective prong of the Katz formula. The
Miller-Smith test considers only the empirical question of whether
the Consumer should have held her subjective belief—that is,
whether she should have expected potential additional disclosures
to third parties.117 The second Katz prong, however, makes
Id. This explanation demonstrates that it is not just the precautions the caller
takes to protect his privacy by closing the door that entitles him to rely on the
Fourth Amendment, it is also the fact that telephone communication plays a vital
role in society and therefore is worthy of protection.
115
See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 14, at 8-47 (describing conceptions of
privacy in American colonies).
116
See Brenner, supra note 13, at __.
117
Miller recognized that Katz was the governing case, but it narrowed the
Fourth Amendment issue to the following:
But in Katz the Court also stressed that “(w)hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.” We must examine the nature of the particular documents
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constitutional sense only if it addresses a totally different question:
On balance, should society protect the privacy of information
disclosed in such a fashion?118 This prong, in other words, forces
the courts to decide whether it is in society’s interest to extend the
zone of privacy even to protect confidential disclosures. The
Supreme Court somehow lost sight of this issue and turned Katz
sought to be protected in order to determine whether there is a
legitimate “expectation of privacy” concerning their contents.
U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (citations omitted). The Court then
concluded:
All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and
deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business . . . . The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.
Id. at 442-43. Smith adopts a similar approach:
The second question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation
of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
“reasonable,” . . . —whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the
individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is “justifiable” under the
circumstances.
Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations omitted).
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the
modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally
completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had
placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a different
constitutional result is required because the telephone company has
decided to automate.
Id. at 744-45 (citation omitted).
118
This is the only reasonable reading of the above quoted statement that a
caller who takes the precaution to call from a phone booth with the door closed
is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 91, at 22
& accompanying text. But see Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (converting the inquiry
simply to an objective inquiry into risk assumption: “The second question is
whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’” . . . —whether, in the words of the Katz
majority, the individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is ‘justifiable’ under
the circumstances”).
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into a test that eliminated the issue of societal interest, the only
appropriate constitutional concern. The result is a mere tort-like
foreseeability test: Information is private only if the Consumer
could not foresee its disclosure by a Collector.
The difference between Katz and Katz-as-interpreted-byMiller-Smith, is far from merely semantic. Katz does not direct
courts to analyze whether a disclosure was foreseeable, as MillerSmith suggest, but to determine whether information falls within a
definition of “private.” Whereas Miller-Smith ipso facto deny
Fourth Amendment protection simply because the Consumer could
foresee the risk of disclosure, Katz requires the court to evaluate
the facts to determine whether the information remains private
under the Fourth Amendment despite disclosure. Under Katz, the
court should consider (1) whether the Consumer has bargained for
a promise not to disclose the information to the public or
Government, (2) whether the Collector ever actually sees the
information, (3) the nature of the information, and (4) the societal
benefits of the Consumer’s disclosures to the Collector. Under
Miller-Smith those facts are irrelevant, but under Katz¸ they are
relevant to both of the prongs.119 The first three of the four facts
are relevant to the first prong because each is relevant to an
expectation whether the Collector would disclose the Data: A
reasonable Consumer could have a subjective expectation of
privacy because a Collector is certainly less likely to disclose Data
that (1) it has promised to keep confidential, (2) it never sees, and
(3) the Collector would appreciate is private because of the nature
of the information (e.g., health Data). All four facts fit more
appropriately into the second prong because (1) society has an
interest in enforcing bargains, (2) a mere transfer of Data is not a
disclosure that justifies Government access, (3) information that is
inherently personal is more worthy of societal protection, and (4)
society has an interest in fostering technology and increasing
economic efficiency.

119

The Katz test might be less subject to misapplication if its two prongs
were labeled “individual” and “societal” rather than “subjective” and
“objective.”
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2. A Compilation of Digital Data Is Not the Equivalent To A
“Disclosure” of Information
Miller and Smith also erred in devising notions of disclosure
based on a comparison of personal communication to the transfer
of data. The reasoning in both Smith and Miller relied on cases
such as United States v. Hoffa120 that dealt with verbal disclosures
by one individual to other persons.121 In Hoffa, the Court held that,
although the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
unwarranted government intrusions into their homes, offices and
hotel rooms,122 it does not protect them from their misplaced belief
that those in whom they confide will not share their confidences
with the authorities. 123
There is, however, a constitutionally significant factual
distinction between Hoffa and Government access to stored digital
transaction data. In the former situation, the individual who
communicates with another person (i) knows what he has said, (ii)
knows that the recipient is not only able, but likely, to evaluate the
implications of the information transmitted, and (iii) knows that the
recipient may decide, based on that evaluation, to disclose the
information to others. The one who shares information with
another individual is also likely to appreciate and rely on the limits
of human memory and the cognitive constraints sociologists call
“bounded rationality.” The person who shares information also is
likely, as a matter of empirical reality, to have some idea of what
other information the recipient can combine with the information
transmitted.124
120

385 U.S. 293, 301-302 (1966). See also Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 437-40 (1963).
121
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301-02.
122
Id. at 301.
123
Id. at 302 (“Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed
the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief
that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal
it.”).
124
For a discussion of the legal implications of the limits of the human
mind to absorb and correlate information, see generally Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211
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Now, contrast that scenario with the transfer of transactional
data in even a simple Internet purchase, such as buying a book
from Amazon.com. Because she does not knowingly interact with
another human being, the Consumer who buys the book has little
reason to believe that a human being will ever observe or evaluate
the transaction data. Moreover, depending on her computer
expertise, she may fail to appreciate the precise Data that is
transmitted and is equally unlikely to have any appreciable
understanding of how the Data can be sliced, diced and mixed with
other data in the Collector’s database.125 In other words, it is
simply not reasonable to conclude that a Consumer who is not well
versed in computer technology would view a transfer of digital
information as presenting the same risk of a disclosure to
Governmental authorities as a verbal conversation with a
confidante. Nor would such Consumer be able to appreciate the
extent to which the Collector and Government can aggregate the
data deriving from a discrete transaction with the Collector with
information totally unrelated to the transaction. It is, therefore,
simply not “reasonable” to conflate the two scenarios and assume
that any online transfer of data is a disclosure of the type addressed
by Hoffa and analogous cases.
How can we reconcile this conclusion with the holdings in
Smith and Miller? As to Smith, the facts are certainly more
analogous to the transactional transfer of data described in the
preceding paragraph than they are to the “snitch” scenario that
provided the factual foundation for Hoffa. We might attribute the
holding in Smith to the fact that it was decided almost three
decades ago, at a time when members of the Court were
(1995).
125

For example, a Consumer who acquires smart house technology may do
so primarily for security reasons. She might not be aware of the extent to which
real time Data is transmitted and retained by the Collector, nor might she
comprehend how that Data can be aggregated with information about utility and
telephone usage to provide a comprehensive picture of the activities within the
house. It is, of course, the very people who are most unsophisticated about
computer technology who are most likely to under-appreciate the extent to
which their use of the technology could eliminate their Fourth Amendment
rights.
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presumably unaware of the potential for, and consequences of,
mining data from transactions mediated by evolving
technologies.126 But one member of the Smith Court, Justice
Marshall, saw the majority’s error all too clearly.
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion
of choice . . . . [I]n the third-party consensual surveillance
cases, . . . the defendant presumably had exercised some
discretion in deciding who should enjoy his confidential
communications . . . . By contrast here, unless a person is
prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a
personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but
accept the risk of surveillance . . . . It is idle to speak of
‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter,
individuals have no realistic alternative.127
Furthermore, just two years prior to the Smith decision, the
Privacy Protection Study Commission had issued a report that
pointed out the dangers of allowing unfettered government access
to data held by third parties.128
126

The precursor of the Internet existed when Smith was decided, but it had
not yet permeated popular culture; that process began with the introduction of
personal computers in the early 1980’s. See, e.g., “ARPANET,” Wikipedia: The
Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARPANET; Eric S. Raymond,
A Brief History of Hackerdom (2000), http://www. hackemate.
com.ar/hacking/eng/ part_00.htm#toc3.
127
Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 749-50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128
See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN
AN INFORMATION SOCIETY, Chapter 9 (1977), http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/
1977privacy/c9.htm:
Traditionally, the records an individual might keep on his daily
activities, financial transactions, or net worth were beyond government
reach unless the government could establish probable cause to believe a
crime had been committed. If government were merely suspicious and
wanted to investigate, such records were unavailable. The legal
standards that protected them evolved in a world where such records
were almost universally in the actual possession of the individual.
Reflecting that reality, the law only barred government from seizing
records in the possession of the individual . . . . [T]hat world no longer
exists. Third parties . . . now keep a great many records documenting
various activities of a particular individual. Indeed, these third parties
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It seems, therefore, that the only explanation for the Smith
holding is that the Court simply erred, presumably because it failed
to contemplate the devastating effects that using the Katz
assumption of risk calculus to assess the constitutionality of data
disclosure by third-parties would have upon privacy. Inferential
support for this interpretation of Smith comes from state court
decisions that have rejected its holding.129
keep records about the individual he would not ordinarily have kept in
the past. Records for life and health insurance, for example, are
repositories of highly intimate personal data . . . which were virtually
unknown until recent decades . . . .
The existence of records about an individual that are not in his
possession poses serious privacy protection problems . . . . Record
keepers can . . . [and] often do . . . disclose records . . . to government
without seeking the individual’s approval . . . . A government request
made informally through a personal visit to the record keeper or by a
telephone call . . . may leave no trace . . . . Even if the individual is
given notice and documentation of the disclosure, he has no legal right
to challenge the propriety of government access to his records, despite
the possibility that the government agent might have been on a “fishing
expedition.”
Id. (citations omitted).
129
See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956 (N.J. 1982):
The telephone caller is . . . entitled to assume that the numbers he dials
in the privacy of his home will be recorded solely for the telephone
company’s business purposes. From the viewpoint of the customer, all
the information which he furnishes with respect to a particular call is
private. The numbers dialed are private. The call is made from a
person’s home or office, locations entitled to protection under . . . the
New Jersey Constitution.
See also People v. Spoerleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141-42 (Colo. 1983).
A telephone is a necessary component of modern life. It is a personal
and business necessity indispensable to one’s ability to effectively
communicate in today’s complex society. When a telephone call is
made, it is as if two people are having a conversation in the privacy of
the home or office . . . .
The concomitant disclosure to the telephone company, for internal
business purposes, of the numbers dialed by the telephone subscriber
does not alter the caller’s expectation of privacy and transpose it into an
assumed risk of disclosure to the government . . . .
We view the disclosure to the telephone company of the number
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This leaves Miller. How do we explain the Court’s holding?
We could rely on the theory we advanced above to account for the
holding in Smith—but Miller, unlike Smith, did not involve any use
of modern computer technology. In fact, since Miller was decided
during an era where technology had not yet presented the risks to
privacy that are prevalent today, its holding may be a direct
function of the times in which it was decided. The Court held that
Miller lost any Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy by
assuming the risk that a bank employee would and could read the
information on any one of his checks. The Court cited Hoffa for
the proposition that one assumes the risk that those in whom she
“confides” will share those confidences with the Government.130
dialed as simply the unavoidable consequence of the subscriber’s use of
the telephone as a means of communication . . . . Any use the telephone
company might make of such information for its own internal
accounting purposes is far different from governmental evidence
gathering.
One’s disclosure of certain facts to the telephone company as a
necessary concomitant for using an instrument of private
communication hardly supports the assumption that the company will
voluntarily convey that information to others. Telephone companies are
in the business of providing telephone subscribers with the equipment
necessary for electronic communication in today’s world. The
government, in contrast, investigates for the purpose of prosecuting
persons for criminal offenses. The expectation that information
acquired by the telephone company will not be transferred
without legal process to the government for use against the telephone
subscriber appears to us to be an eminently reasonable one.
Id. Accord State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Idaho 1988).
130
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Smith Court
used the same approach and finds that neither the nature of the data disclosed or
the recipient’s decisions as to what information to retain or how to collect it are
constitutionally significant:
The fortuity of whether or not the phone company in fact elects to make
a quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does not in our
view, make any constitutional difference. Regardless of the phone
company’s election, petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information
that it had facilities for recording and that it was free to record. In these
circumstances, petitioner assumed the risk that the information would
be divulged to police. Under petitioner’s theory, Fourth Amendment
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Writing in 1976, the Miller Court may have operated on the
assumption that transacting business with a local bank was
sufficiently analogous to communicating with a confidante to
support the application of the Hoffa rationale. That is, members of
the Court who were a product of a distinctly non-technological era
may have assumed that when one dealt with a bank, one dealt with
a person—with a teller or a personal banker. If you accept this
assumption, then it at least becomes conceivable to apply the Hoffa
assumption of risk calculus to bank records.
There are, however, factual problems with this assumption,
even in a non-technological world. For instance, even if a bank
employee who was responsible for processing checks in the 1970’s
had the opportunity to view individual checks, he likely could not
have remembered the information on any one check from among
the thousands he processed each day.131 Today, with advances in
automation and the increased efficiency of check processing
operations, it is unimaginable that a court reasonably could draw
protection would exist, or not, depending on how the telephone
company chose to define local-dialing zones, and depending on how it
chose to bill its customers for local calls. Calls placed across town, or
dialed directly, would be protected; calls placed across the river, or
dialed with operator assistance, might not be. We are not inclined to
make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially in
circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation.
We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability entertained no
actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that,
even if he did, his expectation was not “legitimate.”
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
131
In the late 1980s, one of the authors was general counsel of a bank that
processed checks for over 100 other financial institutions. The clerks who
processed checks handled such a volume that they essentially performed their
tasks in a “mindless” fashion. This appears to have been true throughout the
industry. See David H. Autor et al., Upstairs, Downstairs: How Introducing
Computer Technology Changed Skills and Pay on Two Floors of Cabot Bank,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston – Regional Review (2002), http://www.
bos.frb. org/economic/nerr/rr2002/q2/upstairs.htm. Moreover, given the volume
of checks processed and the number of processors, it is highly unlikely that any
bank employee even saw a significant percentage of any Consumer’s checks.
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the Miller inference.132
There are also conceptual problems with the Miller holding.
The Miller result is flawed even if we accept, for purposes of
analysis, the empirical assumption that clerks read and remember
bank records. Engaging in financial transactions with a bank, even
when the bank is represented by an individual, is not analogous to
“confiding” in another human being. The structure of the
transaction differentiates it from the type of face-to-face interaction
at issue in Hoffa. Miller’s transfer of information did not create the
risk of disclosure to Government; it was, rather, the bank’s
retention, compilation and sorting of that information that
permitted Government to obtain useful information about Miller.
To phrase the principle more generally, the Consumer has not
“disclosed” the information that eventually ends up in
Government’s hands. It is, instead, the Collector’s compilation and
sorting of Data that “discloses” usable information to Government.
3. Disclosure To One Party In A Relationship Is Not Disclosure To
the Public
Even if we assume, arguendo, that a transfer of digital
information is a “disclosure” in the Katz sense, the Miller-Smith
approach still conflicts with a historically grounded judicial
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Miller-Smith
opinions implicitly assume that a disclosure to a trusted, reputable
Collector is the same as indiscriminate disclosure to the public.133
While that assumption might follow from an analysis premised on
the mere presence of theoretical risk, it ignores the societal value
of well-placed trust. That is, society does not benefit from trust
132

Id. From the authors’ description of the actual processes conducted by
employees, it is clear that employees today have neither the time nor any reason
to assimilate or aggregate information on individual transactions or across
transactions.
133
See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“[I]n Katz the Court . . . stressed that
‘[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.’”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).

BRENNER MACROED.DOC

258

4/18/2006 12:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

among thieves (the Hoffa situation), but it does benefit from trust
among the parties to legitimate personal and commercial
transactions. A society that encourages or at least respects trust in
these situations enables the Consumer to enjoy the benefits of new
technologies without fear that information that would not
otherwise be “capture-able” will be appropriated by the
Government. Encouraging and respecting trust also allows
Collectors to offer those technologies at lower prices because
Consumers do not have to negotiate additional protections nor do
Collectors have to provide assurances beyond mere trustworthy
undertakings.
Neither the Miller nor the Smith Court explained why any
disclosure is equivalent to a public disclosure, even though the
logical inconsistency of this proposition is apparent. Public
disclosure forfeits Fourth Amendment protection because it
eliminates any possible claim that Government intrusion has
affected a Consumer’s privacy interests. There is far less harm in
letting the Government access information the Consumer has
shown she has no interest in keeping from anyone. The
Government should not be put in a position inferior to that of the
general public; what is available to “the public” should also be
available to the Government without its having to satisfy the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. So, we cannot raise
Fourth Amendment objections if the Government obtains
information we post on a publicly-accessible website, displayed in
our front yards or discussed in loud voices while on cell phones in
a crowded airport. In each of these situations we have clearly
demonstrated our lack of interest in controlling access to the
information in question. In each of these situations, we have also
broadcast the information by knowingly or recklessly sending it
into the public domain.
The conduct at issue in these and other broadcast scenarios is
vastly different from the conduct involved in, for example, (i)
disclosing information to a Collector over a secure Internet
connection in the course of purchasing sexual dysfunction
medicines, pornography or religious literature and/or (ii) disclosing
information as an incident of utilizing the services of an ISP, a
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telephone company or a company that provides security or other
monitoring services to one’s home or office.134 The disclosures in
categories (i) and (ii) are controlled disclosures, in that they
represent the limited, focused sharing of information with a
Collector as an integral part of a legitimate transaction between the
individual and that Collector.135 In that sense, disclosures of this
type are more analogous to communications encompassed by
evidentiary privileges than they are to the “broadcast” disclosures
described in the preceding paragraph.136
By failing to appreciate the difference between “broadcast”
disclosures and controlled disclosures, Miller and Smith
oversimplify the privacy equation in a fashion that erodes Fourth
Amendment protections. The Court should therefore overrule the
Miller-Smith “per se public disclosure” rule and implement a
Fourth Amendment standard that protects a Consumer’s controlled
disclosure of information to a Collector as a reasonable incident of
a legitimate transaction for goods or services. Fourth Amendment
privacy should not be lost when the event that “frustrates” the
Consumer’s expectation of privacy is Government’s action,
including its purchase of Data for surveillance or investigatory
purposes, its use of regulatory leverage, or its ability to induce
disclosure by a quid pro quo bargain arising out of its investigation
of the Collector.137
134

The fact that a professional athlete proclaims his use of a sexual
dysfunction product does not establish that society should decline to regard the
transaction noted in the text above as worthy of Fourth Amendment protection.
The same holds for the purchase of non-obscene pornography or religious
literature, both of which are protected by the First Amendment.
135
We would not, as noted earlier, bring the Hoffa “snitch” scenario into
the Fourth Amendment calculus. For one thing, society has no interest in
protecting trust in such relationships. For another, the communications in
“snitch” scenarios intrinsically involve unlawful activity, unlike the legitimate
transactions discussed in the text above.
136
See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES §1.2.1 (2002) (“Recognition of
evidentiary privileges . . . promotes personal autonomy in the sense of decisional
privacy.”).
137
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“The Fourth
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4. The Assumption of Risk Doctrine Ignores the Consumer’s
Bargain With the Collector and Her Lack of Meaningful Choice
For the Miller-Smith assumption of risk principle to make
sense, the following conditions would have to exist: (1) the
Consumer did not secure the Collector’s promise not to disclose
certain information to Government; and (2) at the time she made
the disclosure, she had a realistic, practical choice either to (a)
reveal that information and forego privacy or (b) not disclose the
information and retain privacy. Regarding the first condition, it
perverts the English language to say that a Consumer assumed the
risk of disclosure when she entered into a transaction with a
Collector who promised to maintain the confidentiality of data she
provided by the Consumer, either as part of a basic service
agreement or website terms of use.138 Instead, the Collector has
Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to
which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”). The
authorities should not be able to rely on the “frustration” they have caused. A
more difficult issue might concern the ability of Government to use Data a
Collector freely discloses albeit in violation of the Collector’s confidentiality
agreement. One could argue that this is just a variant of the Hoffa snitch scenario
and the Government should be able to take advantage of the Collector’s
unilateral decision, thereby leaving the Consumer with her civil remedies
against the Collector. We believe, however, that Government should not be able
to use that Data because the privacy interest is “shared” and therefore not the
Collector’s to disclose unilaterally.
138
Websites vary in how they address the privacy of information. Google
for example, has a fairly weak statement of privacy. See Google Privacy Policy
Highlights, http://www.google.com/privacy.html. Banks, on the other hand, are
more likely to warrant greater privacy protection, given the more sensitive
nature of the Data they typically collect. See Bank of America Privacy Policy for
Consumers,
http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/
index.cfm?template=privacysecur_cnsmr (“For example, Customer Information
may be disclosed in connection with a subpoena or similar legal process, fraud
prevention or investigation, risk management and security, and recording of
deeds of trust and mortgages in public records.”). Of course, given the current
state of the law, Collectors may feel free to carve out from their privacy pledge
government requests for Data. See, e.g., Insure.com Privacy Policy,
http://www.insure.com/privacy_statement.html. The same argument applies
when a Consumer transacts business with a website that advertises that it is
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assumed the risk of maintaining privacy. Allocating the risk to the
Consumer gives the Government an incentive to see that the
Collector breaches its agreement with her; this, in turn, would only
encourage Government to abuse its leverage as a regulator and
prosecutor, something which some suggest is already occurring.139
certified as maintaining consumer privacy. See, e.g., Insure.com Home Page,
www.insure.com (promoting that the website is secure by including a logo
stating that it is a “VeriSign Secured Site”). Certifications would be an efficient
substitute for detailed contractual provisions. Recognition of Fourth Amendment
protections for data covered by a confidentiality agreement under the approach
urged here would create a market for such certification programs.
139
See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCEINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING
BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY 10-11 (2004) [hereinafter ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX].
To obtain information about individuals’ activities, the government
often need do no more than ask. Many companies are willing to hand
over the details of their customers’ purchases or activities based on a
simple request from the FBI or other authorities. Some companies
believe they are being patriotic; others may be afraid to turn down
‘voluntary’ requests because they fear regulatory or law enforcement
scrutiny of their own activities; others may simply be eager to please.
Multiple airlines have admitted turning over the records of their
customers’ travels to the government. In each case, the information was
turned over not to help the government solve a particular crime or track
a particular suspect, but in order to examine each traveler’s records in
the hopes of identifying terrorists by detecting ‘suspicious’ patterns in
his or her travels – in effect, turning every traveler into a suspect.
Id.
Scuba shops. In May 2002 the Professional Association of Diving
Instructors voluntarily provided the FBI with a disk containing the
names, addresses and other personal information of about 2 million
people, nearly every U.S. citizen who had learned to scuba dive in the
previous three years.
Colleges and universities. A 2001 survey found that 195 colleges and
universities had turned over private information on students to the FBI,
often in apparent violation of privacy laws; 172 of them did not even
wait for a subpoena.
Travel companies. A 2001 survey of travel and transportation
companies found that 64 percent had provided customer or employee
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The Miller-Smith assumption of risk principle is based on the
Court’s holding in Hoffa that individuals accept the risk of
disclosure of their criminal plans.140 Hoffa is, however, factually
and conceptually inapposite to the Consumer-Collector
relationship. For one thing, Hoffa, who made the disclosure, did
not bargain for confidentiality or have any reason to repose trust.
Indeed, the opposite is true—a reasonable person would have had
every reason to distrust the faithfulness of his criminal associate.
The criminal relationship is distinguishable from the relationship
between the Consumer and the Collector with whom she transacts
business in the ordinary course in reliance on the Collector’s
assurances of confidentiality. In the snitch scenario, the person is
clearly taking “unreasonable” chances; in the Consumer-Collector
relationship, the Consumer is simply acting as a rational, lawabiding person operating in a market economy. Also, we must not
underestimate the coercive force of a Government “request” to a
Collector for information about a Consumer.141 Even if the
Collector is not a directly regulated entity such as a bank or
insurance company, legitimate businesses will feel pressure to
cooperate with law enforcement requests for information for a
variety of reasons,142 not the least of which is the Collector’s need
for cooperation from law enforcement in the event that it becomes
a victim of cybercrime.
The lack of meaningful choice also distinguishes the
Consumer-Collector relationship from the snitch scenario that
produced the holding in Hoffa.143 Nothing in the history of the
Fourth Amendment suggests that citizens should have to choose
between their constitutional rights and access to the most efficient
means of participating in commercial and personal affairs.144 Yet
data to the government, many of them in violation of their own privacy
policies.
Id. at 11 (notes omitted).
140
See infra Part II.B.2.
141
See ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 139.
142
Id.
143
See infra Part II.B.2.
144
Indeed, a concern for protecting business and commercial premises was
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the ever-increasing pervasiveness of technology, the growth of
electronic commerce and the developments in database technology
mean that citizens accessing such basic services as
communications and banking jeopardize their Fourth Amendment
protections just by acting as rational Consumers.
The Court essentially conceded as much in Smith, when it
recognized that Government could not destroy subjective
expectations of privacy by televising notices that citizens were
subject to warrantless search.145 Miller and Smith effectively
constitute such a notice: use a bank or a phone and you lose your
Fourth Amendment privacy. In a society marked by ubiquitous
technology, the choice to share or not share Data is meaningful
only to the Consumer who is willing to forego participation in that
society. Miller and Smith simply reached the wrong conclusion. At
the beginning of the twenty-first century it has become apparent
that it is not prudent to hold Consumers to a Hobson’s choice
between enjoying the benefits of modern technology and foregoing
their privacy, or becoming Luddites and retaining a level of
one of the factors that prompted adopting of the Fourth Amendment. See
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978).
145
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz’s two-pronged
inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment
protection. For example, if Government were suddenly to announce on
nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any
actual expectation or privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country . . .
erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his
telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding
the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such
circumstances, where an individual’s subjective expectations had been
‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could
play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a ‘legitimate
expectation of privacy’ existed in such cases, a normative inquiry
would be proper.
Id. What we propose in this article is just such a “normative inquiry.”
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privacy.
5. The Doctrine Encourages Economic Inefficiencies by Ignoring
Societal Interests in Privacy and In the Promotion of
Technological Advances
Through their legislatures, Americans have expressed an
abiding interest in maintaining the privacy of stored transactional
data. Recent statutes such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act146 and
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996147
include extensive privacy protection provisions. This concern over
privacy of stored data is also demonstrated by the massive grass
roots objections to a “know your customer” regulation proposed by
the federal banking agencies in 1999. More specifically, this
legislation has generated tens of thousands of written objections
from the public.148 Thus, it is clear that the American public
perceives as reasonable an expectation that Collectors will
maintain the confidentiality of their stored data. Clearly,
Americans do not assume that permitting Collectors to maintain
extensive databases of information gives the Collector the right or
power to disclose that information as the Collector wishes.
Therefore, denying Fourth Amendment protection simply because
the Collector bows to Government pressure149 to release the
information can only jeopardize the confidence of Consumers in
the Collectors’ undertakings that involve confidentiality.
Jeopardizing that confidence is bad policy for two reasons.
First, it will cause Consumers to be less likely to share
information, which will result in less reliable information being
146

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2005) (protecting
privacy of non-public personal information provided by consumers to financial
institutions, especially with respect to disclosure to other commercial entities).
147
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512(e) (2005) (protecting privacy of non-public personal health
information held by doctors, hospitals, insurers, benefit plans and others).
148
See Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 15310
(Mar. 31, 1999).
149
See ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 139.
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provided to Collectors and therefore, less efficient service by
vendors. Because this chilling effect is likely to be random,
depending as it does on the sensitivity of particular Consumers to
privacy issues and the nature of the goods or services provided by
the Collector, Collectors will be unable to make accurate
adjustments to their Data, and there is likely to be a net loss in
Consumer economic welfare.
Moreover, application of the current Miller-Smith assumption
of risk doctrine to Government requests to Collectors for
information will tend to discourage technological advance. First,
Collectors’ compliance costs will increase on the reasonable
assumption that Government requests for information will be
broader and more frequent than they would be if Government had
to obtain a warrant. Second, some Consumers will forgo the use of
technology that involves data retention because they value their
privacy more than any time or costs savings associated with the
technology. We suggest that there is little policy basis for the Court
to adopt a rule that makes Fourth Amendment protection depend
on the economic considerations involved in a Consumer’s choice
to buy pornography at a brick and mortar store instead of over the
Internet, especially when we consider the cost savings generally
inherent in electronic commerce.
In sum, the Miller-Smith approach represents flawed
constitutional analysis, unsound economic policy, and harmful
social engineering. The Court’s formalistic view of privacy, which
turns on an un-empirical, non-conceptual notion of assumption of
risk, rewards Government for lazy investigation while chilling
citizens’ willingness to take advantage of the efficiencies and
conveniences of new technologies. A non-zero-sum approach to
privacy that derives from relationships created to take advantage of
new technologies and that is analogous to old-century notions of
privacy would be more consistent with Consumer expectations
while minimally interfering with Government’s ability to conduct
appropriate investigations.
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III. RELATION-BASED SHARED PRIVACY
The reasoning set forth in Section II leads us to the conclusion
that Fourth Amendment protection should not depend on a legallyformalistic assumption of risk model. Instead, we believe that it is
more consonant with the purposes and history of the Fourth
Amendment for constitutional protection to turn on the nature of
the relationship between Consumers and Collectors. The question
should be whether the parties have entered into a relationship that
demonstrates an intent to share the Data, thus giving each party an
independent constitutional interest in keeping that Data private.
Stated differently, we contend that Fourth Amendment protection
for Data should depend on whether the general purposes that lead
(1) Collectors to store and mine it and (2) Consumers to permit that
storage and manipulation, reflect the parties’ legitimate expectation
that the Collector will not exercise sole dominion over the Data.
Whether this shared-privacy interest exists is determined from the
nature of the transactions involved and the expressions of the
parties regarding their relationships.
This model derives not from the language of the Fourth
Amendment, for Fourth Amendment analysis is derivative in the
sense that the Amendment protects, but does not create, privacy
interests. Nor do we draw our analysis from legal principles,
although it does bear similarities to traditional property analysis
(e.g., the notion that different parties can share ownership interests
in the same thing), and traditional contract analysis (e.g., that
parties’ reliance interests are worthy of legal protection because
honoring reliance encourages commerce and discourages unjust
enrichment).
We call the approach we derive from this analysis “relationbased shared privacy.” In this section, we define the types of
relationships and the nature of the privacy expectations that should
produce a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy for stored
transactional data maintained by a Collector. Next, we identify
four parameters for determining whether Data should be subject to
Fourth Amendment protection. Each parameter derives from the
underlying competing interests balanced by the Fourth
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Amendment: the Consumer’s privacy interest in the information
and Government’s need for it.
We start with the premise that one can share information
without contemplating that the information will be disclosed to the
public or even to other third persons. We do not suggest, however,
that Government should have to inquire on a case-by-case basis
into either the subjective or objective intent of parties who disclose
information. Rather, Fourth Amendment protection can be based
solely on the existence of defined relationships from which we can
conclude that society does or should recognize a privacy interest.
For example, if we look to old-century analogs, we see that society
has long recognized that many of these disclosures take place in
the course of defined relationships, such as wife/husband,
patient/doctor, client/attorney, and penitent/priest, where society’s
interest in maintaining the free flow of information justifies even
an evidentiary privilege. We also can identify other relationships
that have enough societal significance, if only from the viewpoint
of personal autonomy and economic efficiency, to justify
protecting the disclosing party’s interest in the confidentiality of
the information even if society does not recognize that the
information should be privileged from disclosure in court
proceedings. Trade secret protection and enforcement of
confidentially (non-disclosure) agreements are just two examples
of doctrines that recognize “shared privacy” interests.150
In other words, the existence of a relationship of a given nature
can demonstrate that the disclosing party expected that the
information disclosed would be kept confidential and that her
expectation was reasonable. Absent the relationship, the
information would not be private. For example, a conversation
150

Of course, the notion of shared privacy does not depend on the existence
of express confidentiality agreements. For example, when servants in the home
were more common, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the presence of a
servant destroyed the privacy of a conversation between family members. The
servants understood that a condition of their employment was that the
conversations stayed in the room. It would make no sense from a societal
viewpoint to hold that a conversation was not private just because family
members failed to dismiss the servant from the room before conversing.
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between a husband and wife in front of a butler serving dinner in
the family dining room would remain private, while the same
conversation in the presence of a waiter in a restaurant would not,
in the absence of other circumstances, be private.151
We conclude that the Fourth Amendment should apply to Data
maintained by a Collector with respect to a Consumer under the
following conditions:
(a) the Consumer has provided, and the Collector has
collected and retained, the Data in the course of a
relationship that permits a reasonable inference that the
Data would not be practicably available but for the Data
collection and mining capabilities of “pervasive
technology;”
(b) the Collector maintains the Data (i) at least in part for
the direct benefit of the Consumer and (ii) the Consumer
has direct access to at least a material part of the Data;
(c) the Collector has agreed not to disclose the Data to third
parties without the Consumer’s consent; and
(d) Government fails to demonstrate that it could have
obtained the Data, independent of a request to the
Collector, in the course of employing its own reasonable
and ordinary techniques undertaken in connection with the
151

We see two key differences in the two situations. First, the first
conversation takes place in the home, where there is a greater expectation of
privacy. However, this spatial consideration does not apply to the present
context. The more important difference for present purposes is that the spouses
have an existing relationship with the butler based at least in part on the trust
that the butler will respect the confidentiality of family conversations. In other
words, the nature of the trust is that neither the spouses nor the butler feels that
the butler is free to disclose the conversation outside the home. This conclusion
is based on the historic understanding that the privacy of the home encompassed
family members, servants and guests. See, e.g., Oysted v. Shed, 13 Mass 520,
522-23 (1816).
No such trust relationship exists with the waiter at least in the absence of
other circumstances. The situation might, we repeat might, be different if, for
example, the spouses are regular customers of the restaurant and the waiter is
their usual waiter who is familiar with their habits.
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investigation of a specific crime.
A. Relation-based
Ubiquitous technology requires a re-evaluation of the
appropriate balancing of private and public interests for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Government should have access to Data
that the Consumer has set adrift in the stream of commerce in the
sense that the same information would have been disclosed to
casual observers or employees of the Collector in comparable realworld transactions. On the other hand, the mere fact that a
Collector possesses Data should not enable Government to obtain
it. The problem lies in attempting to identify the factors that should
be taken into account in determining the appropriate balance in
cases between these two extremes.
One way to determine the application of the Fourth
Amendment in the world of pervasive technology is to compare
such technological transactions with analogous real-world
transactions. For example, one factor to consider is the “visibility”
or “publicity” of the transaction that created the Data at issue. The
Consumer who buys an automobile tire at a retail store has no
expectation that the fact of her purchase is private because the
seller’s employees and other customers can see the purchase; also,
anyone seeing her car can infer that she had purchased that brand
of tire.152 The fact of the purchase, therefore, is not private in any
sense. Thus, the tire purchaser cannot complain if Government
obtains Data from the retail store, or from manufacturer,
confirming the fact that she bought that tire or from obtaining
related transactional Data such as the time, date and price of the
purchase.
The same rule should hold true of Data identifying a single
transaction in the pervasive technology world if sufficient indicia
identifying that transaction are inherently public. For example,
Data regarding a tire purchase does not become private just
152

See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-83 (1983) (holding
that it is not considered a “search” to use a beeper to track someone’s
movements in public spaces).
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because the purchaser completes the transaction in the privacy of
her home through cheaptire.com and puts the tire on her car in her
own garage with the garage door closed. Even though she may
hide from public view many of the aspects of the transaction, the
telltale sign is still visible to the public as soon as she takes the car
onto the public streets, so Government should have access to the
Data for the same reason as stated above for a retail store
transaction, assuming, of course, that it can identify the seller.153
Different concerns are present, however, when a Consumer and
a Collector each manifest an intention to maintain the privacy of
transactions that otherwise might be public. For example, a
Consumer who desires to purchase prescription medicine and
wishes to maintain her privacy might be entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection if she purchases the medicine through a
secure website that promises confidentiality and that delivers the
medicine in a plain wrapper. The Consumer in this instance is in a
sense taking the Katz precaution of calling from a closed phone
booth instead of a pay phone on a restaurant wall, and her decision
to maintain her privacy should be honored for the same reason.
The intention to maintain privacy is readily inferable when a
Consumer, in the course of creating or continuing a relationship
that anticipates at least the strong likelihood of multiple
transactions, provides “personal profile” Data that the Collector
combines in a database with transactional Data. Such a relationship
can be found in the delivery of “profile Data” to the Collector with
an expectation on the part of the Consumer and the Collector that
the Collector will combine profile Data with transactional Data.154
This combination of personal information with the details of
multiple transactions creates a corpus of information that
153

Thus, although an on-line purchase may not make the Data per se
private, it might have the same effect by making it impracticable for
Government to locate the Collector.
154
We use “profile Data” to refer to “tool Data” and “Biographical Data”
as those terms are defined in supra note 40. We emphasize that while each item
of profile Data may be public in some sense (e.g., Social Security number,
weight, birth date, mother’s maiden name) they it can be private when
aggregated.

BRENNER MACROED.DOC

4/18/2006 12:35 PM

PRIVACY RIGHTS IN TRANSACTIONAL DATA

271

bystanders could not observe and thus supports a conclusion that
the Consumer and Collector have entered into a private
relationship.155 Moreover, the Consumer’s willingness to allow the
Collector to combine personal and transactional Data into a
database allows us to infer that the Consumer reposes enough trust
in the Collector’s goods or services that she anticipates repeated
dealings with the Collector.156 The combination of a corpus of
complex information and the prospect of repeated dealings is
sufficient to create and sustain a Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy; it also creates the possibility that an aggregation of Data
can compromise Consumer privacy.157
155

For example, it would not be reasonable to expect that any observer of
my purchase at Wal-Mart on a given date could keep track of everything I
purchased and associate that with my name and credit card number, much less
combine that Data with other Data available to Wal-Mart in its database such as
details of my other purchases over the years, warranty claims, and information
derivable from credit-reporting agencies obtainable with my credit card data
such as address. In other words, by shopping at Wal-Mart I have allowed a
collection of Data to exist that would be incredibly expensive, if not impossible,
to obtain through traditional eyewitness observation.
156
The trust we refer to is not trust that the Collector will not disclose
information. Rather, it is the Consumer’s trust in the value of the Collector’s
products such that the Consumer anticipates continued dealing with the
Collector. It is this trust that makes the Consumer’s disclosure of Data to the
Collector reasonable under the second prong of the Katz test. See supra note 103
& accompanying text.
157
Note that the Consumer may have an expectation of privacy even if such
Data pertained to a transaction occurring outside the context of pervasive
technology. For example, mail order and phone order transactions are not
observable by third parties any more than Internet transactions, and the records
maintained by the Collector may not differ between the two types of
transactions. To the extent that database technology is employed in such “oldworld” transactions, our argument, as set forth below, may apply to those
transactions as well because Consumers should be encouraged to participate
fully in modern society without requiring a forfeiture of constitutional
protections. We also note that drawing distinctions in any of these types of
transactions based on comparisons of database contents to the potential
recollections of Collector employees is not persuasive, especially when
transactions are completed solely on the basis of digital transmissions and
computer generated documents and records. For example, given computer
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Why should the existence of a relationship with no legal
substance or grounding have Fourth Amendment significance? The
answer to that question requires us to revisit the notions of privacy
discussed previously in Section I. Pervasive technology changes
the focus of privacy from a Consumer’s right of physical control
over space or tangible property into a right to impose economic
sanctions for disclosure of information in databases over which the
Consumer has no physical control or access. While the notion of
physical control is a reasonable approach to implementing Fourth
Amendment privacy when we deal with spaces and things, it is
meaningless with respect to a modern information-based economy.
The very nature of an information-based economy depends on the
transfers of information, and to that extent the maintenance of
exclusive control renders information valueless. As a result,
commercial parties virtually always require a transferee of
“proprietary” (i.e. non-public) Data to execute a “non-disclosure
agreement.”158 If commercial parties with substantial resources at
stake cannot insist on physical control over Data, it is difficult to
imagine how any good faith application of the second Katz prong
requires such control. That is, the practice demonstrates that
society is prepared to respect privacy claims as to information even
when the claimant has failed to retain physical control or access.
Requiring physical control, therefore, would effectively place Data
beyond the Fourth Amendment without any balancing of societal
costs. In short, neither control nor rights of physical access can
provide a limiting principle that will distinguish Fourth
Amendment-protected interests in Data. Instead, we need a
surrogate that will enable us to avoid both the total abrogation of
the Fourth Amendment to Data in a world of pervasive technology
and an unprincipled ad hoc application that turns on mere
technology, no employee even completes an address label. This distinction is no
less meaningful because it was not credited in Miller, where the Court found a
disclosure even though there was no showing (and little likelihood) that any
bank employee had or realistically could have had any knowledge of the
information contained in the bank’s records.
158
See Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law—What Law
Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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formalistic notions of privacy.
Focusing on the existence of a “trust” relation between the
Consumer and the Collector, even though the trust may be merely
inferential and minimal, enables us to evaluate the reasonableness
of a Consumer’s claim that Data remains private. This is true even
though the Data is being maintained by a Collector in a format
easily accessible upon Government request. Prior to the
implementation of pervasive data collection, retention and
aggregation technology, there was not a realistic possibility that a
Collector could disclose Data reflecting a Consumer’s personal
profile information and the details of numerous specific
transactions between the Consumer and the Collector. We can
therefore confidently say that Consumers in most circumstances
had a reasonable, empirically-based expectation that the aggregate
Data reflecting those transactions was not available to
Government. When the Consumer “trusts” the Collector and its
products enough to anticipate the potential for such aggregation of
information, it is unreasonable to conclude that the Consumer in
providing Data is indifferent to its use. In a very real sense the trust
in the Collector’s products reflects trust in the integrity of the
Collector to maintain the privacy of the Data provided.159
Unless we are ready to adopt the view that Fourth Amendment
protection should continually narrow as technology increasingly
permits information to be stored and correlated, there is little
reason to conclude that a Consumer should expect that Data
becomes public just because it is mined and aggregated. That is,
Data inaccessible in the real-world should not lose Fourth
Amendment protection just because it can be accessed in the
pervasive world. Even if the Data can be readily provided to
Government upon request, Katz nevertheless counsels that, as a
matter of societal values, a Consumer can still reasonably expect
that it will not be so disclosed simply because she has chosen to
conduct her affairs by using more efficient pervasive technology to
conduct transactions with “trusted” parties.

159

See supra notes 138-39 & accompanying text for examples
demonstrating the prevalence of such Consumer attitudes.
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B. Shared Interest Based on Direct Consumer Benefit and
Access

Not all Data possessed by a Collector in the course of a “trust”
relation will be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. There is
still a role for assumption of risk. A Consumer should be held to
have assumed the risk that Data collected at the sole instigation
and for the sole benefit of the Collector is beyond Fourth
Amendment protection because the Consumer effectively set the
Data adrift in the stream of commerce. For example, before the
advent of Data mining, businesses collected Data for internal
marketing, inventory control, product quality, regulatory and
warranty liability purposes. The Collector’s use of that Data
indirectly benefited Consumers in general, whether by lower prices
or higher quality. Usually, however, the Data itself was not
manipulated and re-disclosed to assist the Consumer in making
additional purchase decisions or obtaining services.160 Stated
differently, individual Consumers received no direct benefit from
the collection of the Data. Therefore, one could not reasonably
conclude that the Consumer had provided the underlying
information with the expectation that the Collector would use the
Data for the Consumer’s own purposes and benefit. In short, the
Consumer had given up any “interest” in the information.
In contrast, Consumers who provide “profile” Data to
Collectors generally do so because that profile information, when
combined with transactional Data, saves the Consumer time and/or
money. A significant amount of those savings can derive from the
ability of database technology to aggregate or isolate Data to
provide the Consumer with new information or insights regarding
her dealings with the Collector. Amazon and eBay are perhaps the
most famous examples of merchants facilitating customers
purchasing by keeping track of past purchases and items of
interest, and by offering suggestions based on profiling
information. This practice is now so widespread that the websites
of our banks, our electric utility companies, our insurerers and
160

To the extent the information was so used by salespeople, for example,
our notion of shared privacy might apply.
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others readily present me with personalized information that
greatly reduces my need to keep my own records or to conduct
extensive investigations of suitable products. In this context, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the Consumer has a shared
interest in the Data because Consumers are induced to provide the
relevant information at least in part on the ground that it will
benefit them as much as the Collector. Because the Consumer
retains an interest in the Data, the Collector should not have a
unilateral right to consent to disclosure to Government. Moreover,
it is reasonable for society to protect that Data from Government
access because disclosure would discourage Consumers from
sharing Data that allows them to make more intelligent and more
efficient transactional decisions. As Katz demonstrates, Consumers
who take reasonable steps to protect or enhance their privacy do
not lose their Fourth Amendment rights just because a party with
whom that information is shared decides to disclose it to
Government.
This shared interest is particularly evident when the Collector
enters Consumer-provided Data into a database that allows the
Consumer direct access to information about the Consumer’s
dealings with the Collector. The right and value of direct access to
information regarding past transactions and related financial
information is one of the great benefits of Internet-accessible Data
mining. For example, by going to “My Account” on a electricity
utility’s website, a Consumer can review her past electricity usage,
compare it to average usage statistics, estimate potential energy
saving from replacing her water heater, and evaluate the effect of
various pricing options in light of her particular energy usage
patterns. Such access permits a Consumer to use the Data for her
own purposes unrelated to any benefit to the Collector. For
example, a Consumer might consult information on orbitz.com
regarding past flights and hotel stays in connection with
purchasing travel services on expedia.com or directly from an
airline. Therefore, the independent usage strengthens the notion of
a shared interest by both the Collector and the Consumer.
Direct access also reinforces the significance of the “relation”
element because it demonstrates the existence of a more permanent
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relationship between the Collector and the Consumer. The
Collector incurs the expense of creating and maintaining the
database to increase the likelihood that the Consumer will enter
into additional transactions with the Collector. It is this repetition
that creates the aggregation of Data that increases the risk of an
invasion of privacy and invalidates an analogy to observation of
real-world transactions. In short, direct access is a significant
limiting characteristic of relation-based shared privacy because it is
strong, investment-backed evidence that the Collector and the
Consumer are parties not just to a transaction, but to a private
relationship.
C. Confidentiality Representation or Agreement
Parties in the world of pervasive technology rely on contractual
promises to control access to Data. A Consumer should be required
to demonstrate that such a promise existed if she desires Fourth
Amendment protection for her Data. Otherwise, her privacy claim
is simply not reasonable or credible. Those who do not value
privacy enough to satisfy this simple element cannot complain
when the Collector complies with a Government request for Data.
We do not mean to suggest that Consumers must draft their own
confidentiality agreements or even have read, much less fully
appreciate, a Collector’s “website terms of use” regarding privacy
and Data usage.161 Instead, it is likely that market forces will be
sufficient to attract privacy-conscious/valuing Consumers to
Collectors who unilaterally represent that they will not disclose
Consumer-related Data to Government or third parties without the
Consumer’s consent. Thus, a Consumer satisfies this element of
161

One might argue that the Consumer should have to demonstrate
knowledge of the privacy undertaking as a condition to satisfying the first
(subjective) prong of the Katz test. We believe, however, that placing that
burden on the Consumer would (i) ignore rational Consumer behavior in relying
on the branding efforts of leading merchants and on referrals from friends and
others and (ii) impose unnecessary transaction costs (reading such terms) for
little societal benefit. In other words, ignorance based on trust should be bliss,
until Government shows that the trust was misplaced.
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relation-based shared privacy by demonstrating that the Collector
included such a confidentiality undertaking in its customer
agreement or website terms of use. It should also be sufficient to
show that a third party credentialing service has certified that the
Collector’s privacy procedures include a commitment not to
disclose Data to Government without a warrant or grand jury
subpoena.
D. Government Need
The final element of the principle of relation-based shared
privacy might be understood better as an exception to the general
rule established by Subparts A through C. The rule should not
apply when its application would only make Government incur
unnecessary costs or delays in getting information it could
practicably obtain for similar real-world transactions. Therefore,
even if a Consumer establishes the first three elements of the
principle, Government still should be able to obtain the Data by
convincing the Collector to comply with a request if the
Government can show it would have uncovered the information
contained in the Data by using in good faith its own reasonable and
ordinary techniques in the course of a criminal investigation.
For example, a hackneyed Hollywood police investigatory
technique involves checking with dry cleaners to determine the
possible owner of clothing found at the crime scene. There is no
suggestion that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the cleaner from
checking its records to identify the laundry mark on a shirt. We do
not suggest that a different result should obtain simply because the
Collector complies with such a crime-originated request by
referring to bar coded laundry marks and Consumer accessible
Data on laundry preferences and usage. However, the burden is on
Government to demonstrate that it could have obtained the relevant
information even without access to the relevant database.
Government could satisfy that burden, for example, by showing
that the laundry could have provided the relevant information just
from Data maintained for its own purposes, even though the Data
would have been protected under the first three elements of
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relation-based shared privacy. For example, the laundry could
disclose information, such as name, address and telephone Data
obtained to help it contact customers in case of loss or damage to
articles or a customer’s failure to pick up and pay for articles
cleaned. What it could not do is associate that Data with other Data
which it maintained for the Consumer’s benefit, such as historical
data on cleaning of overcoats.
This “could have obtained it anyway” notion should not be
applied too generously, especially in the context of requests for
large amounts of Data.162 Data mining and sifting enable detailed,
sophisticated and rapid analysis of data that only a generation ago
would have taken a team of investigators months to analyze.
Therefore, the exception should not apply simply because the Data
requested could have been derived from records, such as individual
invoices or meter readings, the Collector “always” maintained.
Rather, the exception should apply only if it is reasonable to
conclude that (i) a Collector would have complied with a request
for the Data in that format and (ii) Government (or the Collector)
would have been able to create the Data actually requested within
the timeframe and budgetary constraints of the investigation at
issue.
The requirement of “good faith” should also be emphasized. In
making requests of Collectors, Government should rely on
traditional citizen incentives to cooperate with crime
investigations. Any use of leverage by Government to obtain
“cooperation” by threats or suggestions of unrelated regulatory
initiatives or independent investigations of the Collector’s own
activities does not constitute good faith. Nor should Government
be able to rely on promises or threats related to cybercrime
protection for the Collector. A Collector should not be put in the
position of sacrificing a Consumer’s privacy interests to protect the
162

Government requests to Collectors for Data does not raise Fourth
Amendment concerns when the Data requested are aggregated and not
attributable to specific Consumers. Although Collectors are free to ignore such
requests, Government should be able to make the request and use the Data
because such Data do not disclose any information that could compromise any
Consumer’s privacy interest.
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Collector’s own interests. This likelihood that a Collector will
succumb to such leverage is especially great where the Consumer
is unlikely to have the resources to enforce its contractual rights of
non-disclosure and/or where any enforcement would be futile
because of difficulties of proving causation or damages.
Finally, the exception should not swallow the rule—it is
intended only to assure that cyber-based Data does not receive
more protection than traditional sources of information. There is a
great tendency for Government to seek access to Data to determine
if a crime has been committed or to identify crime risks. Although
such requests may be finely tuned enough that they cannot fairly
be called fishing expeditions, there is nothing particularized about
them and the comparison to the “general warrant” procedure can
be readily drawn. The exception under discussion cannot be used
to justify such surveillance-based searches. Once Government
shows, however, that its request for Data was made in good faith in
the course of the investigation of a specific crime, it should not be
precluded from using that Data in prosecution of that crime or
other crimes as long as the conditions of the exception are met.
CONCLUSION
History demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment has always
been construed to require a balance between two societal interests:
Government’s need to enforce the law and the citizen’s need to be
left alone. The appropriate balance may change as our culture
changes and as our views of the relative importance of law
enforcement and privacy change. Mere changes in technology,
however, should not affect that balance unless and until they are
incorporated in our culture. The phenomena of pervasive computer
technology and data mining and sifting will eventually change our
society in fundamental ways, but they are too recent to affect the
Fourth Amendment balance. In the meantime, constitutional law
should encourage Americans to enjoy the benefits of technological
advances without concern that doing so will force them to sacrifice
their constitutional rights. Thus, courts should apply the Fourth
Amendment on a technologically neutral basis—new technology
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should neither per se extend nor retract the scope of
constitutionally permissible Government intrusions.
We have argued that the pervasiveness of computer and
database technology creates significant new risks of Government
intrusions into the fabric of our daily lives. The low cost of
information retrieval and increasing Government leverage over
information Collectors substantially increases the risk that those
intrusions will occur beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz provided a
workable standard for protecting Consumers from Government
attempts to take advantage of pervasive technology, the Court’s
decisions in Miller and Smith rely too heavily on legalistic
concepts divorced from societal interests. As a result, a real danger
exists that aggregations of extremely sensitive personal
information will be available to Government just for the asking.
We believe that the traditional balance, as reflected in Katz, can
be retained only if the Court rejects the formalistic “assumption of
risk” approach and instead recognizes the privacy interests inherent
in aggregations of stored transactional data. We have proposed a
principle of “relation-based shared privacy” which distinguishes
Data that should be protected because it is in society’s interests to
facilitate trust-based relationships and efficient sharing of
information. By focusing on specific attributes of those
relationships while protecting Government’s ability to investigate
crimes efficiently, our principle assures that Consumers who take
advantage of pervasive technologies will not thereby sacrifice their
right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.

